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Decisions about saving, retirement, pension annuitization and investment in human capital are 
commonly assumed to depend on predicted longevity. Biased expectations will lead to sub-
optimal choices and reduced wellbeing. Inadequate retirement savings as a consequence of 
excessive pessimism regarding survival chances might result in an impoverished old age, while 
undue optimism in evaluating the mortality risk associated with illness may cause non-adherence 
to medication, inadequate adjustment of health behaviour and further deterioration in health. If 
ability to acquire health knowledge, perceive risks and process information differ by education 
and cognitive functioning, then the accuracy of longevity expectations would be anticipated to 
vary with these characteristics. This may help explain the accumulating evidence of heterogeneity 
by education and cognition in behaviours that would optimally arise from planning household 
finances over a lifetime horizon (Fang et al. 2008, Banks et al. 2010, Christelis et al. 2010, Smith 
et al. 2010, Behrman et al. 2012, Agarwal and Mazumder 2013). 
We use eight waves of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) of older Americans to 
examine whether ability to predict longevity varies with education and cognitive functioning. We 
find that even high school dropouts and the least cognitively able report survival probabilities 
that predict within sample mortality. However, these groups are less accurate than their more 
educated and cognitively able contemporaries. This is relevant to positive analysis of economic 
and health behaviour and to normative evaluation of inequality in the resulting outcomes. It also 
has implications for the design of policy related to financial advice and health promotion. 
To cast light on the source of variation in the accuracy of longevity expectations, we examine 
whether there are differences by education and cognitive functioning in the extent to which new 
information arising from the onset of illness is incorporated into subjective survival probabilities. 
This extends analyses based on the first two waves of the HRS that examined how survival 
expectations are revised on average (Hurd and McGarry 2002) and by the smoking status of the 
respondent (Smith et al. 2001). Exploiting many more waves of HRS to identify health changes 
that could be used to revise expectations, we do not find that the response to the onset of health 
conditions is systematically and consistently lower among the least educated and cognitively able.  
There are clear differences in the stability of expectations over time. There is less persistence in 
the survival probabilities reported by individuals in the lowest education and cognition groups. 
Interpreted within a Bayesian learning framework, this would suggest that these individuals have 
less confidence in their prior estimate of the probability of survival. The same groups report 
survival probabilities that display greater unexplained variation. High school dropouts and the 
least cognitively able appear to find it more difficult to estimate their longevity: their estimates 
fluctuate more over time, are explained less by objective risk factors and are weaker predictors of 
actual mortality.  
Education and cognition are highly but not perfectly correlated. When we allow heterogeneity in 
both dimensions simultaneously, the difference in the accuracy of expectations by education is 
stronger. This would suggest that low education is associated with a knowledge deficit, and 
possibly also a deprivation of experience, that hampers the evaluation of survival chances. Using 
data on numeracy available only in later waves of the survey, we establish that differences in the 
veracity of expectations by numeracy are considerably stronger than those by education and 
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cognition. Individuals with poor numerical skills either formulate the least accurate longevity 
beliefs or have the greatest difficulty in expressing their beliefs in a probability.  
Poor numeracy and cognitive skills are known to impede understanding of probabilities (Bruine 
de Bruin et al. 2000, Peters 2008). Of particular relevance to our findings are studies showing 
that low numeracy is associated with lack of comprehension of medical advice concerning 
treatments associated with different survival probabilities (Schwartz et al. 1997, Reyna and 
Brainerd 2007, Zikmund-Fisher et al. 2007). The less numerate and cognitively able may 
therefore be expected to have difficulty utilizing information on mortality risks and formulating a 
longevity belief in terms of a survival probability.  
This limited ability to think probabilistically about longevity, and possibly other prospects, is a 
potential explanation of the strong correlation between cognitive functioning and decision taking 
with respect to household finances (Banks and Oldfield 2007, Banks et al. 2010, Smith et al. 
2010, Christelis et al. 2010, Behrman et al. 2012, Agarwal and Mazumder 2013) , health insurance 
(Fang et al. 2008) and health (Gottfredson and Deary 2004, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010). 
Individuals with limited education and/or low cognitive ability may be less likely to save for 
retirement because they have difficulty making a probabilistic assessment of the horizon over 
which they should plan. The same constraint offers a potential explanation of experimental 
evidence demonstrating that individuals with low education, limited numerical ability and poor 
financial literacy skills have greater difficulty valuing an annuity (Brown et al. 2013). If one finds 
it difficult to evaluate the probability of living to 75, then the value of insurance against longevity 
risk will be even more difficult to establish. More generally, incapacity to form accurate longevity 
expectations may be one factor contributing to impaired decision-making ability and resulting in 
poor quality decisions (Choi et al. 2014).  
Variation in the accuracy of subjective survival probabilities is relevant not only to evaluation of 
observed differences household finances. It may also help explain the well-established education 
gradient in health, which is increasingly attributed, at least in part, to a knowledge and cognition 
deficit that impedes the ability of the less educated to process information on risky health 
behaviours (Kenkel 1991, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010). Lange (2011) finds that the less 
educated are less likely both to incorporate objective risks of cancers into subjective assessments 
of those risks and to take preventive measures to reduce the risks. While we do not find that the 
survival chances reported by the least educated are least responsive to a condition such as cancer, 
we do show that this group is least successful in predicting longevity. This may distort decisions 
taken with respect to preventive care and lifestyle choices with consequences for health.1  
Other studies have established that individuals are able, on average, to report subjective survival 
probabilities that predict within sample mortality in the HRS (Smith et al. 2001, Hurd and 
McGarry 2002, Siegel et al. 2003, Hurd 2009) and other surveys (Van Doorn and Kasl 1998, 
Kutlu-Koc and Kalwij 2013). We extend the evidence by documenting heterogeneity in the 
                                                                 
1 Without examining the education gradient, Hurd (2009) finds that smokers and heavy d rinkers overestimate their 
survival chances relative to actual survival rates  within the HRS sample. On the other hand, Smith, Taylor et al. 
(2001), also using the HRS, find that smokers are more responsive to smoking–related mortality risks. Using Dutch 
data. Kutlu Koc and Kalwij (2013) find that subjective longevity expectations are less responsive to smoking, 
alcohol, overweight and obesity than is actual longevity.  
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accuracy of longevity expectations by education and cognition. In doing so, we move beyond the 
question of whether a representative agent possesses and can process information on his 
longevity prospects that are instrumental to solving lifecycle planning problems. Rather, we 
address a question that has a distributional motivation: Which individuals are more likely to hold 
inaccurate expectations and, consequently, make suboptimal decisions?  
Elder (2013) challenges the claim that reported subjective survival probabilities provide useful 
information, demonstrating that life table survival probabilities do a better job of predicting the 
in-sample mortality of HRS respondents. Indeed, the life table probability should fail to predict 
death by a certain age, on average, only to the extent that the life table does not incorporate 
cohort effects. The more pertinent issue is whether, given the life table probability, the subjective 
probability provides additional information that explains inter individual variation in longevity. 
Elder remains sceptical after finding that the perceived deviation of survival chances from the 
life table average accounts for only 35% of the cross individual variation in reported survival 
probabilities in the HRS. This suggests that there is a great deal of noise in reported survival 
chances. We examine whether the signal to noise ratio is lowest for the least educated and 
cognitively able. 
Delavande and Rohwedder (2011) are considerably more optimistic regarding the information 
content of subjective survival probabilities, arguing that the measure provides a meaningful 
proxy for longevity that allows the socioeconomic gradient in mortality to be estimated without 
observing actual mortality. They show that the gradient by wealth tercile in the reported 
probability of survival to the age of 75 is remarkably similar to the gradient in actual survival to 
75 among the HRS panel respondents who potentially could have reached that age. On the other 
hand, the gradient in reported probabilities by education (and income) is markedly shallower 
than that in actual survival (see Delavande and Rohwedder 2011, online Appendix). This 
suggests that the accuracy of subjective survival probabilities differs by education.2  
Rather than comparing the education (and cognition) gradients in subjective and actual longevity, 
we assess heterogeneity in the accuracy of expectations directly by testing whether subjective 
survival probabilities reported by individuals with lower levels of education (cognition) are less 
predictive of actual survival than are the probabilities reported by those with higher levels of 
education (cognition). We confirm that the survival expectations reported by the less cognitively 
able and educated are indeed less accurate and demonstrate that this is only partly driven by the 
greater tendency of these groups to give focal responses of 0, 50 and 100 percent survival 
chances. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the HRS data on subjective survival 
probability, education, cognition and mortality. The extent to which subjective survival 
probabilities predict mortality and how this varies with education, cognition and numeracy is 
examined in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the extent to which survival chances are revised 
in response to new information on objective mortality risks and test whether this response 
differs by education and cognitive functioning. The final section concludes. 
                                                                 
2 Using Dutch data from a smaller, younger sample in which fewer deaths are observed, Kutlu -Koc and Kalwij 
(2013) find no education gradient in subject ive survival probabilities, but neither do they obtain a significant gradient 
in actual mortality.  
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2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES 
We use data mostly from the original cohort of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
which is a nationally representative sample of individuals born between 1931 and 1941, who 
were aged 50-62 years in 1992 and have been interviewed every two years since. We include 
spouses of the original HRS cohort and of other HRS cohorts only if they were born between 
1931 and 1941.3 We analyse a sample of individuals who were all born within this decade.  
We took all variables from the RAND HRS data files (St. Clair et al. 2009). We use data from 
wave three (1996), from which point consistent measures of cognitive functioning are available, 
until wave ten (2010), at which point the cohort was aged 68-80. Some individuals belonging to 
the 1931-41 birth cohort enter our sample after wave 3 either because of missing covariates in 
that wave or because they are new spouses or spouses of cohorts added to the survey in later 
waves. The analyses are based on 32,437 individual×wave observations for which there is 
complete information on subjective survival probabilities, vital status, education, cognition and 
covariates. 
2.1 SURVIVAL EXPECTATIONS 
The HRS asks the respondent to report the chance that s/he will live to a specified target age on 
a scale of 0-100, with 0 indicating ‘absolutely no chance’ and 100 corresponding to ‘absolutely 
certain’. The target age depends on the respondent’s current age. All those aged 65 and younger 
are asked to report the percentage chance of living to at least the age of 75. In the first four 
waves, those aged 75 or less (including those <66) were asked to evaluate their chances of living 
to at least the age of 85. From the fifth wave, instead of the target age being fixed at 85 for those 
older than 65, it varied with the respondent’s age. The target ages used in the analysis by wave 
and age are identified in (online) Appendix A Table A1. 
We deal with differences in the target age by standardising the reported probability on the 
implied life table probability of survival to the specified target given the respondent’s age and 
gender.4 Specifically, we take the difference between the reported probability and the life table 
probability. A positive value does not necessarily imply that the respondent is overly optimistic. 
Given health, health behaviour and family history, his or her survival chances may very well be 
objectively above the actuarial average based only on age and gender. The reason for the 
transformation is principally to overcome the differences in the questions and so maximise the 
number of observations and waves from which information can be used. In addition, taking the 
deviation from the life table probability eliminates the difference in longevity expectations that is 
                                                                 
3 Direct members of the AHEAD (born<1924),  CODA (1924-30), War Babies (WB) (1942-47) and Early Baby 
Boomers (EBB) (1948-53) cohorts are not included since they were not born between 1931 and 1941. Our 
estimation sample consists of 32,437 individual×wave observations from the HRS original cohort  (core members & 
spouses), 154 from the AHEAD/HRS overlap, 85 spouses from AHEAD, 24 spouses from CODA, 130 spouses 
from WB and 2 spouses from EBB. 
4 Life table probabilities are produced by the National Center for Health  Statistics  
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm#life). These probabilities are available within the RAND HRS 
data files. The probability of survival to age T is  calculated as the number of a (sex specific) birth cohort surviving to 
that age divided by the number of the same cohort surviving to the respondent’s age at  the time of the survey.  Life 
tables for the year of the survey are used, except that that 2006 life table is used for wave 9 since the 2008 data were 
not yet available.  
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implicit when the same probability of survival to a given target age is reported by individuals who 
differ in age and sex. 
The mean reported survival probability in our estimation sample is five percentage points less 
than the corresponding life table probability, although the median is closer (Table 1). The 
average degree of pessimism is even greater than that indicated by this deficit since the life table 
tends to underestimate the longevity of current cohorts. There is a great deal of variation in the 
difference between the reported and life table probabilities: the standard deviation (29.5) is about 
five times the mean. Variability is to be expected since the life table gives an average, around 
which mortality risks obviously do vary.  
As has previously been recognised (Hamermesh 1985, Hurd and McGarry 1995, Gan et al. 2005, 
Perozek 2008, Elder 2013), women tend to be more pessimistic than men with respect to 
survival chances at all ages (Figure 1). Despite this, we find no evidence that the accuracy of 
subjective survival probabilities in predicting mortality differs significantly by gender and 
allowing for such a difference does not affect the estimated heterogeneity by education and 
cognition. We therefore present estimates from the more parsimonious specification that 
imposes homogeneity in the accuracy of expectations by gender.  
The age pattern in the deviation of the subjective from the life table probability is similar across 
genders (Figure 1). Between the ages of 54 and 64, both males and females become more 
pessimistic. This may reflect failure to revise the probability of survival to the target age of 75 
sufficiently upward as the respondent nears that age (Elder 2013). After the age of 65, the 
difference between the subjective and objective probability narrows and becomes positive 
beyond the age of 70 for males and 75 for females. This tendency for individuals to become 
optimistic in their survival expectations as they enter old age is well-established (Hamermesh 
1985, Hurd et al. 1998, Bissonnette et al. 2012, Elder 2013, Ludwig and Zimper 2013, Wu et al. 
2014). In these data, it appears to be mainly driven by spikes at the ages of 70 and 75, and to a 
lesser extent at 66, that coincide with changes in the target age. This suggests a tendency to 
insufficiently adjust the reported probability downward when the target is raised and the 
objective likelihood of reaching it falls. Between changes in the target age (67-69, 71-74, >75), 
the deviation of the subjective from the life table probability tends to fall.  
About 4% of observations (across all waves) do not answer the survival probability question 
(Table 1). 5  This may reflect difficulty in completing the abstract task of formulating and 
reporting a probability. Focal answers of 0, 50 and 100 percent may be given by individuals who 
have trouble performing the exercise. Around one-quarter of respondents report a value of 50 
percent. Such bunching has been attributed to an extreme form of rounding (Gan et al. 2005, 
Manski and Molinari 2010, Kleinjans and Van Soest 2014), epistemic uncertainty (50%=‘I 
haven’t a clue’) (Fischhoff and Bruine De Bruin 1999, Bruine de Bruin and Carman 2012)  and 
extreme ambiguity (50%=‘I am very unsure’) (Daniel Hill, et al. 2004, Hudomiet and Willis 
2013). About 5% of the sample give an answer of 0 percent to the survival expectations 
question, while three times that fraction answer 100 percent. 
                                                                 
5 In modelling mortality we exclude these observations. Including them reveals that non-response is correlated with 
a higher risk of death in the subsequent period.  
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Table 1 & Figure 1 here 
2.2 EDUCATION AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING 
Education groups are formed from years of schooling and highest qualification obtained, as 
follows: i) high school drop outs and General Educational Development (GED) (0-11 years of 
schooling and no qualification other than GED)6; ii) high school graduate (12 years of schooling 
and high school diploma); some college (more than 12 years of schooling and high school 
diploma or GED); and, iv) college and above (bachelor degree or higher).  
There is a pronounced education gradient in longevity expectations that is in the same direction 
as actual differences in mortality risks.7 On average, high school dropouts report a survival 
probability about 13 percentage points below the actuarial average, while college graduates report 
a mean probability one point above the life table average (Table 1).  
The least educated appear to have the greatest difficulty in providing subjective survival 
probabilities. Across all waves, around 9% of high school dropouts do not answer the question, 
compared with less than 2% of college graduates. When they do answer, the lesser educated are 
significantly more likely to give a focal response of 0, 50 or 100 percent. Kleinjans and Van Soest 
(2014) find, using the HRS, that modelling non-response and focal responses makes little 
difference to the estimated education gradient in longevity expectations. 8  Nonetheless, we 
examine whether estimates of education-related differences in the accuracy of longevity 
expectations are robust to dropping observations giving focal responses. 
In addition to higher non-response and focal response rates, the less educated have been found 
to be more prone to give answers to subjective probability questions that violate monotonicity 
and adding up (Dominitz and Manski 1997, Dominitz and Manski 2006, Delavande and 
Rohwedder 2008, Van Santen et al. 2012).9 On the whole, it seems likely that there is more noise 
in the subjective probabilities reported by the least educated.  
The HRS contains measures of cognitive functioning in several domains based on well validated 
measured tests (Ofstedal et al. 2005, Fisher et al. 2012). We restrict attention to the measures that 
are directed at respondents of all ages and have been fielded in a consistent format since wave 
3. 10  These measures relate to episodic memory and intact mental status. The former enables 
recollection of experiences and specific events from the past (Tulving 1972). It may be required 
                                                                 
6 The GED is an achievement test intended to identify cognitive aptitude equivalent to that of a high school 
graduate. GED is commonly taken by immigrants, war veterans, the home schooled and high school dropouts. We 
categorise those with GED together with high school dropouts since the purpose of the classification is to 
demarcate levels of educational experience (Heckman et al. 2014)  Cognition is identified separately using the tests in  
the HRS.  
7 Population vital statistics  indicate that in  2007 the mortality rate of high school d ropouts aged 55-64 was 2.4 times 
higher than that  of individuals with at least  some college education in the same age range (Xu et al. 2010) (Table 26). The 
education gradient in mortality rates in our sample is given in Table 4.  
8 However, taking an approach that imposes fewer identifying assumptions, Manski and Molinari (2010) find that  
after allowing for non-response and rounding even an age difference in subjective survival probabilities is not 
discernible.  
9 On the other hand, a measure of coherence in subjective expectations of stock market  returns was found to be 
unrelated to education in a US sample (Gouret and Hollard 2011).  
10 At least for first interviews. Some of the measures are,  from 1998 onwards, available only for respondents older 
than 65 or those interviewed for the first time.  
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for reasoning (Smith et al. 2010). In the HRS it is assessed through two word recall tasks. The 
interviewer reads a list of ten common nouns (e.g., book, child, hotel) and the respondent is 
asked immediately to recall as many as possible in any order.11 After five minutes or so, during 
which other questions are answered, the respondent is again requested to recall the words. The 
total recall score is the sum of the number of words recalled in these immediate and delayed 
recall tests (ranging from 0 to 20).  
Mental status refers to the intactness of the neuro-cognitive system essential to communication 
and learning (Smith et al. 2010). It is measured through parts of the Telephone Interview for 
Cognitive Status (TICS) (Brandt et al. 1988). One dimension of mental status is executive 
functioning, which refers to the cognitive processes that facilitate the use of past experience in 
current action (National Center for Learning Disabilities,. 2012). These processes are used in 
planning, organization and management and are likely to be of considerable importance in 
relation to decisions taken concerning pensions, saving, health insurance, retirement and health 
behaviour. The cognitive processes relevant to the tasks we use from the HRS are working 
memory, attention and problem solving. Working memory refers to the ability to store and 
process information simultaneously (Baddeley and Hitch 1974). It, and the other two processes 
referred to, is assessed by asking respondents to subtract 7 from 100 and continue subtracting 7 
from the answer for a total of five subtractions. The test score is the number of correct 
subtractions (0-5). This serial 7’s test is part of the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et al. 
1975), in which it assesses the attention and calculation dimensions of mental status. A second 
test, which additionally assesses processing speed, asks the respondents to count backwards as 
quickly as possible, starting from 20 for 10 continuous numbers. Respondents are allowed two 
trials for this exercise. Scores are recorded as 0 if incorrect or “don’t know/unable to do” on 
both tries, 1 if incorrect on the first try but correct on the second try, and 2 if correct on the first 
try. Three additional elements of mental status are assessed by orientation in time, ability to name 
objects and to recall the names of the President and Vice-President.12 The total mental status 
score sums those of the serial 7’s, backwards counting, date/object/president naming tests and 
ranges from 0 to 15. 
Following Ofstedal, Fisher et al. (2005), we aggregate the measures of episodic memory and 
mental status into a total cognition score, which ranges from 0 to 35.  
Cognitive functioning, particularly episodic memory, decreases with age (Anderson and Craik 
2000). Our aim is not to identify the extent to which expectations become biased as individuals 
age and cognitive functioning declines. Rather, we wish to assess whether individuals who enter 
middle age with relatively low cognitive ability hold less accurate expectations of their length of 
life. If this is the case, it may lead to suboptimal decisions that result in lower wellbeing at older 
ages. Consistent with this objective, we test whether there is heterogeneity in the accuracy and 
the updating of survival expectations by cognition measured at the first time an individual enters 
                                                                 
11 To avoid respondents acquiring familiarity with the words, they are asked to recall  from a different list in each 
successive wave.  
12 Orientation in time is tested by asking the date and the day of the week. Object  naming asks questions such as: 
“What do you usually use to cut paper?”. The score of each test  is the sum the number of correct  answers and 
ranges from 0 to 4 (date), and 0 to 2 (object  and President, Vice-President). These questions are asked of all  
respondents in wave 3 but only of new entrants and those aged 65 and above from wave 4 onwards.  
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our sample.13 We standardize these first-entry cognition scores for age and sex, and examine 
heterogeneity across quartile groups of these standardized scores.14  
Given the positive correlation between cognitive functioning and educational attainment, the 
former is also positively correlated with subjective survival chances (Table 1, middle panel), 
although not as strongly as is education.15 Reporting the probability of survival to a specific age is 
a task that involves cognitive processes, including abstraction, concentration, retrieval and 
processing of information from health experiences, comprehension of the concept of 
probability, and calculation. One would expect ability to accomplish this task to be related to 
cognitive functioning. This appears to be evident in the data. The percentage of the lowest 
cognition group that does not report a survival probability is more than three times that of the 
highest functioning group.  
Previous analyses of the HRS reveal that respondents who score poorly on cognition tests are 
less likely to respond to a variety of subjective probability questions and those who do are more 
likely to give focal responses of 0, 50 or 100 percent (Hurd and McGarry 1995, Kleinjans and 
Van Soest 2014, Johannes Binswanger and Martin Salm. 2014).16 This is evident in Table 1, 
although the relationship between cognition and the likelihood of reporting a probability of 50 
percent is neither monotonic nor as strong as that between education and this response.  
Numeracy is measured in every second wave from wave 6 (2002).17 A numeracy score is given by 
the sum of correct answers to three questions involving calculation of a percentage, division and 
compound interest.18 The score is age-sex standardized as for cognition and quartile groups 
formed using the first measure taken for each individual. 
As for education and cognition, low numeracy is strongly associated with lower subjective 
survival probability, higher non-response and a greater tendency to report survival probabilities 
of 0 and 100 percent (Table 1, bottom panel).19 
                                                                 
13 For most individuals, this is wave 3. For some spouses and those with missing values at wave 3, it is  later waves. 
While we examine heterogeneity in  the accu racy of survival expectations with respect  to the initial measure of 
cognition, the models estimated allow mortality risk to vary with time varying cognitive functioning.  
14 The standardised score is the residual from a linear regression of the score on a full set of sex -specific age-year 
dummies. We form gender specific quartile groups. 
15 The correlation coefficient between years of education and the total cognition score is  0.426 (p-valu e<0.001). 
Mean age-sex standardised cognition scores are: high school dropouts – 28.9, high school graduates – 46.5,  some 
college- 53.9, college graduates – 63.1. Examination of the mean of the difference between th e reported and life 
table survival probability across levels of cognition within an education category, and vice versa, reveals  that 
longevity expectations vary in both dimensions, although the education gradient is stronger and more consistent (see 
Appendix Table A2).  
16 Kleinjans and Van Soest (2014) find that low cognitive functioning, measured by word recall score,  is not 
significantly correlated with a higher probability of reporting a 50% probability, although it is associated with a 
greater tendency to round responses. 
17 From wave 6, numeracy is also measured in the wave in  which a new respondent enters the panel.  
18 The questions are: 1) If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how many people out of 1,000 would be 
expected to get the disease?  2) If 5 people all  have the winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is two million 
dollars, how much will each of them get? 3) Let's say you have $200 in a savings account. The account earns 10 
percent interest per year.  How much would you have in  the account at  the end of two years? Respondents who 
answer 1) and 2)  incorrectly are not asked 3). Answers of ‘Don’t know’ and refusals are considered wrong. 
19 The correlation coefficient between years of education and the numeracy score is  0.4522 (p-value<0.001). 




The death of a HRS cohort member is reported by a relative contacted by an interviewer. A 
sample participant is presumed to be alive if s/he cannot be contacted but there is information 
obtained from a relative or another source that the person is alive. If no information is available, 
possibly because the respondent has dropped out of the HRS when alive and refused to 
participate further in the survey, then vital status is classified as unknown. We trace the vital 
status of each respondent from wave 3 (or the wave in which s/he first appears in our sample) 
until wave 10, which corresponds to a period of 14 years (1996-2010). Of the 6816 individuals 
who appear in our sample at some time, 1347 (19.8%) die by wave 10 and the vital status is 
unknown for 256 (3.8%). 
In Table 2 we present the 14 year mortality rates for all respondents in the estimation sample 
who are observed in wave 3 (N=5210).20 Over the period, around 21% of the respondents died. 
There is a clear gradient in mortality by both education and cognitive functioning. The mortality 
rate among high school dropouts is around twice that of college graduates. The rate for those in 
the bottom quartile group of cognition is slightly less than three quarters greater than that of 
those in the top quartile group.  
Mortality is also strongly correlated with longevity expectations. Of the 312 individuals who 
report a zero probability of survival to the age of 75 in 1996, 142 (45%) do not survive to 2010. 
The mortality rate falls steadily as the reported survival probability rises until reaching the top of 
the distribution. The mortality rate among the one fifth of respondents who report a 100 percent 
chance of surviving to 75 is around 20%, which is substantially greater than the rate for those 
reporting a probability between 51 and 99 percent. While a reported probability of zero does 
appear to contain information on mortality risk, the accuracy of a focal response of 100 is 
particularly low.21  
Table 2 here 
The relationship of longevity expectations to mortality risk by education and cognition is shown 
in Figures 2a and 2b respectively. Those who reported a zero chance of survival experienced an 
elevated mortality rate at all levels of education. The fall in the death rate as the reported 
probability of survival turns positive is steepest for those with a college degree. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that (low) longevity expectations of the most highly educated are most 
accurate. However, one should be careful of reading too much into the variation at the bottom 
of the distribution since only 20 individuals (2%) in the highest education group report a zero 
probability of survival to 75 (see online Appendix A, Table A4). In contrast, 14% of high school 
dropouts report a zero survival chance. A distinct kink in the death rate at a reported survival 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
reported from the li fe table survival probability differs significantly across education levels within each quartile 
group of numeracy. On the other hand, within two of the four education groups (high school dropouts and some college), 
there is no significant difference in expectations by numeracy (see Appendix Table A2) 
20 In this table, we restrict  attention to those observed in wave 3 in order to compute the mortality rate over a fixed 
period (14 years) and because all respondents reported survival chances to a target  age of 75 in that  wave.  
21 The mortality rate among individuals who do not give a response to the survival probability question in wave 3 is 
28.9% compared with 23.5% among those who do respond. The mortality rate among those missing on covariates  is 
also slightly higher. Mortality in our estimation sample is therefore slightly lower than it is  in the full HRS cohort  
aged 54-66 in wave 3.  However,  the gradients by education, cognition and longevity expectations are affected little 
by this selection. See Appendix, Table A3.  
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chance of 50 percent is evident only for college graduates, while the rate turns upwards at a 
response of 100 percent for all groups. On the whole, it is not immediately evident that longevity 
expectations reported by the more highly educated are more accurate. Likewise, Figure 2b does 
not support the hypothesis that the more cognitively able report more accurate expectations.  
This simple analysis may not be indicative of heterogeneity in the accuracy of longevity 
expectations. The mortality rate between 1996 and 2010 of high school dropouts is twice that of 
college graduates (Table 2). This gradient is not fully reflected in the expectations, which suggests 
that the relationship between the actual and perceived mortality risks does vary with education. 22 
Besides the lack of control for covariates, Figure 2 utilises survival probabilities reported in wave 
3 only, which may precede the onset of health conditions. To more fully exploit the information 
potentially in the data, we estimate the mortality hazard as a function of longevity expectations.  
Figure 2 here 
3. ACCURACY OF LONGEVITY EXPECTATIONS 
We assess the accuracy of longevity expectations by examining the extent to which the deviation 
of the reported from the life table probability of survival to a target age predicts death within the 
period of observation. Our main focus is on whether this predictive power varies with 
educational attainment and cognitive functioning.  
3.1 MODELLING LONGEVITY 
We observe a sample of individuals who were alive and aged between 54 and 65 at the time wave 
3 of the HRS was conducted. We observe whether each individual is dead by each subsequent 
wave (4-10). Using these data, we model the probability of death at each age by specifying a 
discrete time hazard. This can be implemented by pooling the data over all waves from the third 
until the tenth, or until the wave in which the individual is recorded as being dead, and 
estimating a binary model of vital status at each wave (Jenkins 1995).  
Let 
i  indicate the age of individual i when she is first observed. Each individual is observed until 
the wave in which her death is recorded or wave 10 if she survives.23 Let 
i it s  indicate age at 
which a spell is completed, such that 
is  represents the years from first observation until either 
death or the end of the observation period. The duration elapsed until the age at death is 
modelled via the probability of a spell ending at each t  given survival to that age, which is the 
discrete time hazard rate (Jenkins 1995), 
  ;it i i ith P T t T t X   , (1) 
                                                                 
22 The mean reported probability of death by 75 of high school dropouts in wave 3 is around 60% greater than the 
probability reported by college graduates. This is  considerably less than the 100% difference in  the actual death rates  
by 2010, although it is recognised that death by 2010 is not the same event as death by the age of 75. We are 
defining the reported probability of death by 75 as one minus the reported probability of survival to 75.  
23 A few individuals drop out of the sample without their vital status being established. Such individuals are used in 





iT  is a discrete random variable representing the age at which a spell ends.
24 These hazards 
map into the probabilities of varying lengths of survival.  
If one ignores potential unobservable heterogeneity in the probability of survival to the age at 
first observation, then the log-likelihood for the discrete time duration model is equivalent to 
that for a binary indicator of vital status at each wave (Jenkins 1995).25 Let
ity  be an indicator of 
the occurrence of death at age t. For those who are still alive in wave 10, 0ity   at all observed 
ages. For those who die during the observation period, 0ity   at all ages except that in the wave 
in which death is recorded, when 1ity  . Such individuals obviously do not appear in subsequent 
waves. The log-likelihood of observing the vital status history of the sample can be written as  
    
1




it it it it
i t





    . (2) 
We specify the hazard rate to be complementary log-log, which is the discrete-time counterpart 
of the hazard for an underlying continuous-time proportional hazards model (Prentice and 
Gloeckler 1978, Jenkins 1995). We estimate hazards of the form, 
     2 21 exp exp ,it it gh f P t    it-Z  (3) 
where  f  is a function of 2itP   - the difference between the reported and life table probability 
of survival to a target age measured at the previous wave, which is two years previous to the 
point at which vital status is established – and covariates, 
it-2
Z . The function  g t  represents the 
baseline hazard of death at each age for a given gender  g , which we specify as piecewise-
constant by including a dummy for each gender-age combination giving a semi-parametric 
specification of the discrete-time duration model (Jones et al. 2012).  
We estimate a variety of models distinguished by the specification of  f . To begin with, this 
function permits no interaction between longevity expectations and either educational attainment 
or cognitive functioning. Estimates from this specification will confirm whether subjective 
survival probabilities predict the length of life. We then allow for an explicit interaction between 
longevity expectations and one or both of education and cognition. We test whether the extent 
to which expectations predict the age at death varies with each of these factors. Using the data 




                                                                 
24 We do not use the precise age at death but rather whether an individual dies  between waves that  are separated by 
around two years. We assume that the underlying survival time is continuous and that deaths occu r at a uniform rate 
within each two year period (Jones et al.  2012) (pp.182-218).  
25 This is not the case if unobserved heterogeneity in survival to the time of inclusion in the stock sample is taken 
into account since then terms corresponding to the probability of being alive at  each wave preceding the observation 
period do not cancel out. 
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3.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
We first examine estimates with no control for covariates other than the gender-age dummies.26 
The purpose is to test whether respondents are able to use all available information, including 
that correlated with observable characteristics, to formulate and report survival probabilities that 
predict longevity. Subsequently, we present estimates from two specifications that cumulatively 
add sets of covariates. We first add socioeconomics characteristics: income, wealth, employment 
status, race and marital status, in addition to education (see Appendix A, Table A5 for variable 
descriptions). Objective mortality risks do vary with wealth and race, for example. To the extent 
that individuals are knowledgeable of this variation and incorporate it into their expectations, the 
predictive power of expectations should decline when control is made for these covariates. But 
without adding these controls there is potentially bias due to heterogeneity in use of the 
reporting scale – for given beliefs about survival prospects – by covariates that are also correlated 
with mortality risks.  
Indicators of health and health behaviour are left out of the first set of covariates in order to test 
whether individuals can utilize the information contained in these measures to predict their 
longevity, and whether the accuracy of predictions based on observable health information varies 
with education and cognition. We then examine the accuracy of longevity expectations 
conditional on indicators of health, smoking and parental longevity and test whether, conditional 
on observable mortality risk factors, longevity expectations are formed on the basis of additional 
information available to the individual, but not observed in the survey data, that is predictive of 
mortality. If, conditional on these additional controls, reported survival probability is still able to 
predict mortality, then this would indicate that individuals hold and utilize private information 
about their survival chances over and above that recorded in a detailed survey like the HRS. 
Again, we examine whether possession and utilization of such private information varies with 
education and cognition.  
We include indicators of the previous existence and recent onset of eight diseases or risk factors: 
lung disease, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, psychiatric illness, high blood pressure and 
arthritis. Additionally, we include measures of current cognitive functioning27 and control for 
psychological distress (depression and anxiety) through a shortened version of the CES-D scale28 
(Steffick 2000).We measure functional status by three Activities of Daily Living (ADL) – 
Instrumental ADL indices following Wallace and Herzog (1995) using only the ADL-IADL 
questions asked consistently across waves. We also include indicators of mobility and large 
muscle problems, as well as fine motor skills. Finally, we control for whether the individual was 
hospitalized in the previous two years, BMI and for whether the person is a current smoker or a 
former smoker. We condition not only on current but also on lagged measures of psychological 
                                                                 
26 We have estimated models that include an  interaction between longevity expectations and gender. The respective 
term is never significant and its inclusion does not alter the gradient in the predictive accuracy of longevity 
expectations by education or cognition. We therefore present estimates from models that no not allow this explicit 
heterogeneity by gender.   
27 Current cognition is captured by measures  that are available in every wave: the total recall  score and the sum of 
the scores of the serial 7’s and backwards counting tests. Both are age-sex standardized. In the models that explicitly 
allow for heterogeneity in the accu racy of longevity expectations by initial cognitive functioning, the quartile groups 
of the total cognition score are included in addition to the current cognition measures.  
28 Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale  (Radloff 1977).  
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distress, functional limitations, hospitalization and BMI. The complete list and their definitions 
are given in Appendix A, Table A5.  
All these health measures are objective in the sense that the respondent is asked to report a 
diagnosed condition, experienced limitation or hospital admission. Respondents are also asked to 
subjectively assess their health as excellent, very good, good, fair or poor. Answering this question may 
involve the processing of information on the diagnoses, symptoms, limitations and treatments 
reported in the previously mentioned measures, along with other complaints and feelings 
considered relevant to the individual’s overall health experience. The respondent may rate not 
only his or her current functioning and wellbeing but also weigh a prognosis of future health, 
possibly including survival chances. A response of poor may reflect pessimism about survival 
chances given the prognosis of some current illness. In this case, this ordinal self-assessed health 
(SAH) question would be at least a partial substitute for the rather more difficult to answer 
survival probability question (Benítez-Silva and Ni 2008). Indeed, there is abundant evidence that 
SAH is predictive of mortality even conditional on physiological measures of health (Idler and 
Benyamini 1997). We purposefully do not control for SAH since the aim is to take account of 
observable longevity-relevant information but not to control for the processing of that 
information in some variable other than subjective survival probability.  
Through genetics, shared environments and inherited health behaviour, parental longevity 
provides information on life expectancy. We include indicators of whether the respondent’s 
mother and father are deceased, the age/age-at-death of each parent and an interaction between 
the indicator of vital status and age-at-death.  
3.3 ACCURACY OF EXPECTATIONS ON AVERAGE 
Table 3 shows the coefficient on the longevity expectations variable – the difference between the 
subjective and life table probability of survival to a target age – in mortality hazard models that 
do not allow for heterogeneity by education or cognition. 29  Taking the exponent of the 
significant coefficient of -0.0168 in the model without covariates gives an estimated hazard ratio 
of 0.9833 with respect to a percentage point increase in the deviation of the subjective 
probability above the life table probability. That is, the hazard rate of death is 1.67% lower for 
each unit increase in the longevity expectations variable. Since the magnitude of the coefficient is 
reasonably small, it approximates this relative change in the hazard rate, which provides a 
convenient interpretation of all the coefficients in the table.30  
As anticipated, controlling for socioeconomic covariates that are correlated with mortality risks 
reduces the magnitude of the longevity expectations coefficient. But it remains highly significant 
indicating that people utilize other available information on mortality risks – most obviously that 
obtained from observing their own health – to predict their longevity with some accuracy. The 
estimate from this model implies that the hazard ratio for a standard deviation increase in the 
longevity expectation measure is 0.6833, which is very close to that for a standard deviation 
increase in wealth (0.6572). The relationship between actual and expected longevity is as strong 
as that between mortality and wealth. 
                                                                 
29 The full estimates for the model including all  covariates are given in Appendix Table A6.  
30 Using exp( ) 1b b  for small b . 
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When control is made for health indicators, smoking and parental longevity in addition to 
socioeconomic characteristics (right-hand column), the coefficient falls substantially but remains 
strongly significant. A percentage point rise in the deviation of the subjective from the life table 
probability is associated with an approximately 0.5% decrease in the hazard rate, which is 27% of 
the estimate obtained with no controls (and 36% of the estimate with only socioeconomic 
controls). Most of the predictive power of the subjective survival probability derives from the 
incorporation of information on mortality risks that are associated with measured health 
indicators, smoking and parental longevity. Once these factors are controlled for, individuals 
apparently possess further information that is useful in predicting their longevity.  
Table 3 here 
3.4 ACCURACY OF EXPECTATIONS BY EDUCATION AND COGNITION 
In Table 4, we present estimates from models that allow the association of longevity expectations 
with the mortality hazard to differ across categories of education and cognitive functioning. The 
table gives the coefficient on the longevity expectation variable for each education/cognition 
category, i.e. the expectations coefficient for the reference category plus the coefficient for the 
category-specific interaction with expectations. This approximates the relative effect on the 
hazard rate of a marginal change in longevity expectations for each group.  
Consider the estimates by education reported in the left-hand panel. The point estimate of the 
expectations effect is increasing with education in all three specifications, which suggests that the 
better educated are indeed more accurate in forecasting their longevity, although the null of 
homogeneity is rejected (at 10% significance) only when there is no control for health, smoking 
and parental longevity (mortality risks). Controlling only for age and sex, longevity expectations are 
a significant predictor of mortality for all education groups. While there is a clear gradient, it 
should not be overlooked that even high school dropouts are capable of reporting survival 
probabilities that do, at least to some extent, predict longevity. A unit increase in the subjective 
survival probability reported by a high school dropout in excess of the life table probability is 
associated with a decrease in the mortality hazard rate of 1.2%. For college graduates, the 
equivalent estimate is 2.1% - around three-quarters greater. Individuals with at least some college 
education are significantly better at predicting their longevity than high school dropouts.  
Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics reduces the coefficients but leaves expectations as 
a significant predictor of mortality for all education groups and does not diminish the education 
gradient in the accuracy of expectations. Once control is made for the full set of covariates, the 
expectations reported by high school dropouts no longer significantly predict their longevity, 
while the expectations variable remains significant for the other education groups. Even after 
conditioning on a large battery of health indicators, smoking behaviour and parental longevity, 
individuals who have at least graduated from high school are able to incorporate information in 
their reported expectations that predicts their longevity. The exploitation of this additional, 
unmeasured information, and not only differential incorporation of information contained in the 
indicators of socioeconomic characteristics, health, smoking and parental longevity, appears to 
give the better educated an advantage in predicting their own demise, although the differences 
across groups are no longer significant with the complete set of covariates. 
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In the middle panel, the accuracy of expectations is allowed to differ by cognition, but not 
education. Controlling only for age and gender, longevity expectations are significant predictors 
of mortality at all levels of cognitive functioning. Even individuals with a cognition score below 
the first quartile report survival probabilities that predict longevity.  The association between 
expectations and realisations rises with cognition but not monotonically. The accuracy of 
expectations for the third quartile group is not significantly different from that of the first 
quartile group. The significant difference between the top and bottom cognition groups is 
roughly similar to that between the top and bottom education groups.  
Controlling for socioeconomic factors leaves the expectations variable as a significant predictor 
of mortality for all cognition groups. The gradient in the accuracy of expectations is affected little 
by adding these controls, although only the top group is significantly different from the bottom. 
Conditioning on mortality risk factors reduces the coefficient for all groups but leaves 
expectations as a significant predictor of longevity for three of the four groups. Individuals with 
the lowest level of cognitive functioning, unlike high school dropouts, appear to form survival 
expectations on the basis of information on mortality risks that is not captured by the rich 
battery of health indicators included. While the point estimates suggests that expectations remain 
more accurate for the highest compared with the lowest cognition group, there is no significant 
difference. All told, differences in the accuracy of longevity expectations by cognitive functioning 
are not quite as strong as those by education. 
The right-hand column of Table 4 shows estimates from models in which the predictive power 
of subjective probabilities is permitted to vary with both education and cognition. At each level 
of education (cognition), we show the effect of the longevity expectations variable for the lowest 
cognition (education) group. Controlling only for age and sex, survival probabilities reported by 
all education-cognition groups predict mortality. Within the first quartile of cognitive 
functioning, the expectations coefficient rises with education but only the difference between 
college graduates and high school dropouts is significant (at 10%). Among college graduates with 
the lowest cognitive functioning, a unit increase in expectations is associated with an 
approximately 1.8% decrease in the hazard rate, compared with a fall of 1.1% for high school 
dropouts with the same (broad) level of functioning. Among high school dropouts, the estimates 
suggest a rise in the accuracy of expectations with cognitive functioning that is neither 
monotonic nor significant. Although it is not apparent in the table, the estimates imply that a 
percentage point increase (above the life table probability) in the survival probability reported by 
a college graduate in the top cognition group is associated with a 2 .3% decrease in the hazard 
rate, compared with a 1.1% decrease associated with a marginal change in the survival chance 
reported by a high school dropout in the lowest cognition group.  
Controlling for socioeconomic factors has little impact. After controlling for health, smoking and 
parental longevity, the residual information in the subjective probabilities reported by high 
school dropouts in the bottom cognition group no longer significantly predicts longevity. 
Holding cognition constant, the point estimates suggest a strengthening relationship with rising 
levels of education, but the difference is only marginally significant (10%) for high school 
graduates and those with some college education. Differences by cognition are weaker, although 
the point estimate for the top cognition group is almost three times the magnitude of that for 
low cognition high school dropouts. The lack of significance of the education and cognition 
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differences in this specification could very well arise from a lack of power given the strong 
overlap between the two characteristics. 
Overall, the analysis indicates that even the least educated individuals with low cognitive ability 
can formulate and report survival expectations that are accurate in the sense of predicting their 
own longevity. But higher educated and more cognitively able individuals are significantly and 
substantially better at predicting their survival chances. For all education and cognition groups, 
predictive power falls substantially when control is made for measurements of health, smoking 
behaviour and parental longevity, suggesting that the information on mortality risks associated 
with these indicators is incorporated into expectations. Remaining differences in the accuracy of 
expectations by education (in particular) and cognition, although they are not always significant, 
suggest that the better educated and more cognitively able are not only better in utilizing 
observed longevity-relevant information, but they hold more additional information on mortality 
risks that is not observed in the covariates. 
Table 4 here 
3.5 ROLE OF FOCAL RESPONSES 
As observed in section 2.2, individuals with lower educational attainment and cognitive 
functioning are more likely to report survival chances of 0, 50 and 100 percent. If these focal 
responses reflect difficulty in comprehending the task of reporting probabilities, are due to a high 
degree of rounding or reflect a good deal of ambiguity over longevity, then they should contain 
less information on mortality risks. Their higher prevalence among the responses of the less 
educated and cognitively able could then potentially explain why these groups are less successful 
in predicting their longevity. To assess the validity of this interpretation of the results, we 
examine whether they are robust to dropping observations giving a focal response.  
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the impact on the longevity expectations coefficient of 
dropping focal responses from models that do not permit heterogeneity by education and 
cognition. Dropping responses of a 50:50 chance of survival has little or no impact on the 
estimate. This is consistent with Figure 2, which shows little sign of a kink in the relationship 
between the mortality rate and the subjective survival probability at a response of 50 (see also 
Delavande and Rohwedder 2008). On average, a reported survival probability of 50 percent does 
not deviate from the true survival chance any more (or less) than do other responses. Dropping 
these responses also has little or no impact on the education and cognition gradients in the 
predictive power of reported survival chances (Table 5).31  
As would be anticipated from Figure 2, dropping responses of 0 reduces the extent to which 
expectations predict actual longevity, on average, while dropping those reporting a 100 percent 
chance of reaching the target age raises the predictive power of expectations (Table 3).32 On 
average, a response of ‘no chance of survival’ is indeed informative of a higher probability of 
                                                                 
31 We show the robustness to dropping focal responses on the estimates of expectations accu racy by education and 
cognition only for the model that controls for socioeconomic covariates. The changes in the estimates obtained 
from the other specifications follow similar patterns. The omitted results are available on request.  
32 Irrespective of the specification of covariates, the 95% confidence interval estimate obtained without each of 
these two focal responses does not include the respective point estimate obtained from the sample including these 
responses, although the respective confidence intervals  do overlap.  
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death but so too is a response of ‘100% chance of survival’ (Delavande and Rohwedder 2008, 
Hurd 2009).  
Dropping responses of 100 raises the predictive power of the reported survival probability for all 
groups but has little impact on the education and cognition differences (Table 5). If anything, 
they widen. Leaving out observations reporting a survival chance of 0 reduces the magnitudes of 
the point estimates of the differences by education and cognition and renders them 
insignificant.33 At least part of the reason the survival chances reported by individuals with low 
education and cognition are less accurate in predicting longevity is that the difference in mortality 
risk associated with a zero and a positive reported probability is smaller for these individuals than 
it is for high education and cognition groups. A zero probability reported by the highly educated 
and cognitively able is more likely to indicate a greatly inflated mortality risk that is correctly 
perceived. Those with low education or cognitive functioning are more likely to be overly 
pessimistic when they report a zero chance of survival.34  
Table 5 here 
3.6 ACCURACY OF EXPECTATIONS BY NUMERACY 
The most numerate individuals are likely to be most comfortable with the concept of probability 
and most successful in expressing a longevity belief in a survival probability. In Table 6 we 
present estimates of the longevity coefficients for education and numeracy quartile groups in 
mortality hazard models estimated using data from wave 6 onwards and including age-sex and 
socioeconomic controls only. 35  With heterogeneity only by education, expectations predict 
longevity significantly for all groups and the point estimates indicate a gradient in the same 
direction as that obtained using data from wave 3 onwards. However, the education gradient in 
the accuracy of expectations is not significant. This is likely attributable to the substantially 
smaller sample size and the much fewer number of deaths observed over an eight, as opposed to 
fourteen, year period. Despite this reduced power, there are significant differences in the 
accuracy of expectations by numeracy skills. The coefficient for the top numeracy quartile group 
is more than twice the magnitude of that of the bottom quartile group. This significant 
difference is maintained when the accuracy of expectations is allowed to vary by both numeracy 
and education. The expectations coefficient of the most numerate high school dropouts is 
double the magnitude of the coefficient of the least numerate dropouts. 
Numeracy skills appear to be particularly pertinent to the formation and reporting of accurate 
survival probabilities. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the early observation that, if 
anything, the accuracy of expectations varies more with education than it does with overall 
cognitive functioning. Numeracy is not cognition. It is a more specific skill that can be taught.  
                                                                 
33 Without controlling for covariates, the education differences remain significant (10%) when responses of zero  are 
dropped. 
34 If observations reporting any one of the three focal responses are dropped, then the education gradient in the 
accu racy of expectations remains: the coefficient for college graduates is  twice the magnitude and significantly 
different from that of high school dropouts. These results are available on request. 
35 The expectations coefficients are larger with control only for age-sex and smaller in magnitude with the full set  of 
controls. Controlling only for age and sex, the effects for the top two numeracy groups are significantly different 
from that for the bottom group. With the full set of controls, there are no significant differences by numeracy.  
These results are available on request. 
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Table 6 here 
4. UPDATING OF LONGEVITY EXPECTATIONS 
We have established that the less educated, cognitively able and numerate hold expectations that 
are less accurate in predicting longevity. This suggests that these groups have less knowledge of 
health signals relevant to mortality risks or are less able to process information on such risks. It 
could also be that the less educated and cognitively able are overly responsive to events that are 
only marginally relevant to longevity. Or they may simply be less able to express beliefs in a 
number, such that there is more noise in their subjective probabilities. A further possibility is that 
the disadvantaged groups are more vulnerable to mortality risks that are more difficult to predict. 
While the HRS, indeed any available data, does not allow one to discriminate between these 
explanations, some insight into why there are education and cognition gradients in the predictive 
accuracy of longevity expectations can be gained by exploring heterogeneity in the updating of 
subjective survival probabilities in response to events that carry varying degrees of information 
on mortality risks.  
4.1 MODELLING EXPECTATIONS 
We suppose that an individual’s subjective survival probability relative to the life table probability 
at a given point in time is a function of that reported in the previous period with an adjustment 
in response to any new information on mortality risk that has become available. We estimate the 
following model, 
  1 ,it it it i itP P f Age Gender       it itHealth δ Relative θ  (4) 
where t  is used here to index the survey wave, 
it
Health is a vector of indicators of the onset of 
disease and health risk factors, and 
it
Relative  contains indicators of parental longevity and 
spousal death. While the dependent variable is already standardized on age and gender by taking 
the deviation from the life table probability, we further control for age and gender to allow for 
the patterns observed in Figure 1, including the spikes at ages corresponding to changes in the 
target age.  
The model is estimated on the same sample used for the mortality analysis. In addition to 
pooling across groups, we look for evidence of heterogeneity in the updating of expectations by 
estimating a separate model for each education/cognition group. 
One might interpret (4) as deriving from an assumption that expectations evolve according to a 
Bayesian learning process (Viscusi and O'Connor 1984, Viscusi 1991, Smith et al. 2001) (see 
online Appendix B). Since the observed differences in accuracy by education and cognition may 
reflect different degrees to which belief formation indeed adheres to Bayesian updating, we do 
not limit our interpretation to this model. If one were to assume that all respondents behave as if 
they are Bayesian, then the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable would represent the 
precision of belief in the prior probability of survival relative to the precision of the estimated 
mortality risk formed on the basis of all new information. Further, division of the coefficient on 
each health change by one minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable would provide 
an estimate of the extent to which that change shifts the risk equivalent - the probability assessed 
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on the basis of all information obtained since the prior was formed. Parameter heterogeneity 
across education and cognition groups would then be interpreted as reflecting differences in the 
degree of confidence placed in the prior probability and in the assessed mortality risk associated 
with a health condition, as well as the precision of the belief in this risk assessment.  
We estimate (4) by ordinary least squares, which is inconsistent in the presence of time invariant 
unobservable determinants of expectations that would necessarily be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. If we use fixed effects and omit the lagged dependent variable, then the 
same conclusion is reached with respect to the main hypothesis of interest – there are little or no 
consistent differences by education (or cognition) in the response of expectations to changes in 
health that represent objective mortality risks (see online Appendix Table A8).36 
4.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
We do not include in Health  all the health indicators that were used in the previous section to 
predict mortality. Doing so would make it difficult to interpret the coefficient on any one 
indicator. For example, this would identify the extent to which longevity expectations are revised 
in response to the experience of a stroke when there is no change in mobility and activities of 
daily living that may be impeded as a consequence of a stroke. We focus instead on the response 
to the onset of the eight diseases or risk factors (lung disease, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, 
stroke, psychiatric illness, high blood pressure and arthritis) without conditioning on the 
measures of functional and mobility limitations, and of psychological distress. The coefficient on 
a health condition should then capture the reassessment of survival chances arising from learning 
of the diagnosis and experiencing the physical and mental consequences of the condition. We do 
include an indicator of whether the person was admitted to hospital in the past two years (and 
not in two years before the previous interview) since this may cause one to re-evaluate life 
expectancy and admission could be for treatment of a condition other than the eight we identify.  
We aim to establish whether subjective survival chances are revised most in response to 
conditions that carry the greatest mortality risk and whether the more educated and cognitively 
able are most responsive to such conditions. In order to establish the objective risks, we estimate 
the mortality hazard as a function of ever having been diagnosed with each of the eight health 
conditions and having been hospitalized in the past two years, plus age-gender dummies to 
capture the baseline hazard. This reveals that lung disease and cancer pose the greatest threat to 
life (see online Appendix A, Table A7). The hazard ratio for each of these diseases, as well as a 
hospital admission, is more than 2.3, indicating an increase in the probability of death between 
waves of more than 130%. Diabetes is the next most life-threatening condition, with a hazard 
ratio of 1.9, which reflects the high prevalence of comorbidities experienced by diabetics. Stroke, 
psychiatric illness and heart disease follow in the death list, each with a hazard ratio of around 1.4, 
which corresponds to less than half of the relative increase in mortality associated with diabetes. 
                                                                 
36 We do not apply system GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998), which in principle can be used to estimate the lagged 
dependent variable model while allowing for time invariant unobservables. The recent literature has drawn attention 
to the often poor finite sample performance of this estimator and has argued that it is  highly reliant on the 
assumption that the correlated unobservables are indeed time invariant (Roodman 2009, Bun and Sarafidis 
forthcoming). This assumption is questionable in the present context. Unobservable differences in  ability to form 
longevity expectations need not be fixed over time. Rather,  more able individuals may learn more from accumulating 
experience and information such that the error in their expectations diminishes.  
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Neither arthritis nor hypertension (conditional on the other conditions) is associated with 
reduced longevity.37  
On the basis of these findings, we categorise the conditions into the following groups ranked by 
decreasing mortality risk: 1) lung disease and cancer; 2) hospital admission; 3) diabetes; 4) stroke 
and heart disease; 5) psychiatric illness; and, 6) hypertension and arthritis. Since psychiatric illness 
is fundamentally different from physical illness and may be anticipated to have a different impact 
on longevity expectations, we keep this condition separate from stroke and heart disease despite 
the objective mortality risks being similar.  
Heterogeneity in the extent to which expectations are revised in response to health conditions 
would be justified if the objective risks varied by education and cognition. We tested this but 
found only a few significant differences by education/cognition in the hazard ratios of specific 
conditions.38 
We include in Relative  indicators of whether the respondent’s father and mother was alive in 
previous wave. If a parent was alive at the time the previous expectation was formed, then there 
is an opportunity to learn more about parental health and longevity that could potentially be used 
to revise expectations. The new information could arise from a parental death, but it could also 
be obtained from witnessing a parent continuing to live when death was anticipated. We have 
determined that the revision of expectations does not differ significantly between those who 
experience a parental bereavement and those whose parent continues to live. We include an 
indicator of whether the respondent has been widowed since the previous wave. While spousal 
longevity need not provide any information on one’s own health and longevity, except to the 
extent that health environments and habits are shared, the death of a partner may be expected to 
prompt contemplation of survival prospects. In addition, there may be a direct impact  of 
bereavement on health and longevity (Van den Berg et al. 2011).  
Demographic effects are captured by a gender dummy and a quadratic in age. This was chosen 
by testing down from more general specifications that allowed for higher order polynomials and 
gender specific age effects. Specifying the age effect as quadratic, rather than a set of year 
dummy variables, allows us to include indicators of the target age change, which depends only on 
age and wave. These indicators pick up the spikes observed in Figure 1. 
                                                                 
37 The ranking of the conditions is not entirely robust to controlling for measures of functional and mobility 
limitations and psychological distress. This is to be expected. For example, conditioning on mobility problems has 
little impact on the cancer coefficient but reduces that  of lung disease, leaving the former as the most life-
threatening disease. Presumably this reflects  the greater mobility restrictions arising from respiratory problems . 
Controlling for the CESD depression score reduces the coefficient on psychiatric illness by more than half and 
leaves it insignificant. This confirms that depression is the most life-threatening form of psychiatric illness and is 
indicative of the interp retation problems that would arise if we were to condition on the health measures, in addition 
to the conditions, in the model of expectations.  
38 The hazard ratio for heart disease is  a significant 1.55 for high school dropouts and an insignificant 1.06 for 
college graduates. The difference between the two groups is significant (p=0.034), and the null of equality across all  
four education groups is rejected at the 10% level (p=0.088). Stroke has no significant impact on mortality for the 
highest and lowest education groups, but significantly raises the risk for the two middle groups. The null of 
homogeneity across the four groups is rejected for this condition (p=0.032). There are no other significant 
differences by education. With respect to cognition, the only significant difference is that hypertension is associated 
with an increased mortality risk for the lowest quartile group but not for the others.  The null of equality in the risk 
across the four groups is rejected (p=0.074).  The detailed results are available on request.  
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4.3 UPDATING OF EXPECTATIONS ON AVERAGE 
The left-hand column of Table 7 gives estimates of model (4). Reporting of the probability of 
survival displays persistence with the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable only 
marginally greater than previous estimates obtained using only the first three waves of the HRS 
(Smith et al. 2001, Smith et al. 2001).39  
The degree to which the survival probability is revised downward on occurrence of each group 
of health conditions is broadly, but not entirely, consistent with their rankings by objective 
mortality risks. The strongest reaction is to the onset of the most life-threatening conditions – 
lung disease and cancer. And there is no significant revision of longevity expectations with the 
onset of hypertension or arthritis, which do not carry any mortality risk. While the subjective and 
objective risk rankings are consistent at the top and bottom, they differ in between. Stroke/heart 
disease and psychiatric illness prompt greater downward revisions of survival expectations than 
does diabetes, although the latter carries a greater objective risk. It seems plausible that 
depression, which is highly correlated with the reporting of any kind of psychiatric illness, causes 
a downward revision of longevity expectations to an extent that is excessive relative to the 
response to more life-threatening physical illnesses. The strong response to stroke may be due to 
the salience of the event, the effects of which can leave the sufferer with a permanent reminder 
of the fragility of her health. The weaker response to diabetes may be because there is a lack of 
appreciation of diabetes being a precursor to a number of comorbidities than can be the eventual 
cause of death.  
Having a mother or a father alive at the time the survival probability was previously reported is 
associated with an upward revision of survival expectations. As mentioned above, this effect 
does not differ significantly depending on whether or not the parent has died since the last wave. 
It suggests that individuals whose parents were alive are more likely to receive some information 
that causes them to revise their longevity expectations upward. Consistent with this, it could be 
that those with surviving parents experience a slower deterioration in health but do not fully 
appreciate the information on their advantageous health trajectory that is provided by their 
parents’ long life. Only as time passes is it observed that health is improving relative to that of 
peers and survival expectations are revised upward. Of course, there is much supposition in this 
explanation. 
The age effects reflect the pattern observed in Figure 1. As the cohort ages the subjective 
survival probability falls further below the life table probability before the gaps begins to closer 
and then becomes positive mainly through the spikes at the changes in the target age.  Females 
become increasingly more pessimistic than males over time. 
If one interprets the estimates as corresponding to parameters of a Bayesian learning model, then 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable implies that the precision associated with the 
prior probability accounts for more than half (55%) of the precision attached to all beliefs on 
which expectations are formed. Equivalently, the precision of the risk estimate based on all new 
                                                                 
39 Strictly, our estimate is not directly comparable to the earlier ones because the dependent variables  differ. We take 
the difference of the subjective from the life table probability, while the earlier estimates are based on the repo rted 
probability of survival to 75. I f individuals do not sufficiently revise their probability upward as they approach the 
target  age,  then there should be less persistent in our measure than in the raw subjective probability.  
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information is less than the precision attached to prior.40 Since the prior is established from 
experience over many years, while the new information is obtained in the last two years, it stands 
to reason that there is more confidence in the accuracy of the estimate of the prior.  
According to this Bayesian learning interpretation, the onset of lung disease or cancer is 
estimated to be assessed as equivalent to a 15 percentage point reduction in the probability of 
survival to the target age.41 The downward revision in the reported probability is less than half of 
this (6.8) because of the uncertainty attached to the subjective estimate of the longevity 
consequences of these diseases. The risk equivalents of the other health conditions are simple 
transformations of the respective coefficients and necessarily rank in the same order.  
Table 7 here 
4.4 UPDATING OF EXPECTATIONS BY EDUCATION & COGNITION 
Education group specific estimates of model (4) are given in the right-hand panel of Table 7. 
There are relatively few significant differences across groups in the coefficients of specific 
variables. One clear difference is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, which 
increases monotonically and significantly in moving from the lowest to the highest education 
group. The reporting of survival probabilities is more stable over time among the more highly 
educated.  
If one were to assume Bayesian updating, then this would suggest that more highly educated 
individuals place greater weight on their prior in the process of updating their expectations. This 
does not necessarily imply that the better educated are less responsive to new information. It is 
only possible to identify the precision of the prior relative to the precision of the estimate 
derived from new information. It could be that the better educated hold more precise estimates 
both of the prior and the risk equivalent obtained from new information. Further, all experiences 
that influence the revision of expectations are not necessarily objectively relevant to longevity. It 
could be that the less educated place undue weight on irrelevant events.  
In assessing the incorporation of new information into expectations one needs to pay attention 
not only to the coefficients but also to the proportion of the variance that is explained. There is 
clear heterogeneity by education in this respect. The explained variability of subjective 
probabilities rises from 29.8% among high school dropouts to 36.5% among college graduates. 
There is more variation in reported longevity expectations that is random, or at least not 
systematically related to observed covariates, among the least educated. Presumably this 
contributes to the survival expectations of high school dropouts being less predictive of their 
longevity than is the case for the higher education groups. 
                                                                 







. See online Appendix B for the correspondence between the lagged dependent variable 
coefficient and the precision parameters.  






. See Appendix B.  
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There are little or no systematic or significant differences across education groups in the revision 
of expectations in response to the onset of health conditions.42 The downward revision of the 
survival probability in response to psychiatric illness is strongest amongst the least educated and 
weakest among the most educated. High school dropouts reduce their longevity expectations 
more in response to psychiatric illness than they do after the onset of cancer or lung disease. 
This may indicate overreaction.43 
There are differences in the effects of demographics. The rate at which female high school 
dropouts become more pessimistic over time compared to their male counterparts is significantly 
greater than the rate of increase in the relative pessimism of women with higher levels of 
education. It would appear that low educated women appreciate least their longevity advantage 
over men as they age. Socioeconomic inequality in longevity is less pronounced among females 
than it is among males (Mustard and Etches 2003)44 and consequently women have a greater 
longevity advantage at low levels of education. This does not appear to be understood.  
Heterogeneity in the updating of survival expectations by cognition and numeracy is similar to 
that by education (see Appendix A, Tables A9 and A10). Expectations are more stable for higher 
cognition and numeracy groups. In fact, this gradient is steeper by cognition and numeracy than 
it is by education. A larger proportion of the variability in expectations is explained for higher 
cognition and numeracy groups, with these gradients again more pronounced than that observed 
by education.  
Unlike for education, there are significant differences by cognition in the response to the most 
life-threatening conditions. The downward revision of the survival probability on the occurrence 
of lung disease or cancer made by the lowest quartile cognition group is no more than half of 
that of the other groups and is significantly less than the revision made by two of the three other 
groups. But there are no clear or significant differences in the response to other conditions.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis confirms that older US citizens can, at least to some extent, predict their longevity. 
This is reassuring for those utilizing economic models that presume agents hold longevity 
expectations that are based on actual mortality risks. It is more disconcerting from the 
perspective of markets in life insurance and pension annuities, which are vulnerable to adverse 
selection if customers hold and exercise private information on their chances of survival to old 
age. The fact that subjective survival probabilities predict longevity even after conditioning on a 
battery of health measures, smoking behaviour and parental longevity, suggests that the average 
                                                                 
42 If the model is run with each health condition entered separately, then the point estimate of the response to 
cancer is smallest for high school dropouts but it does not rise monotonically across the groups and any differences 
are not significant. 
43 The education difference in the response to psychiatric illness is  also apparent in fixed effects estimates (see 
Appendix A, Table A8 – the p-value for the test of no difference between the bottom and top education group is 
0.107). Also consistent in the fixed effects estimates  is that more of the within individual variability in expectations is 
explained for the highest education group, although the gradient in the R-squared is not so clear across all groups as 
it is in the lagged dependent variable model.  
44 The evidence indicates that absolute differences in longevity by socioeconomic status, which are relevant here, are 
smaller for females than males. Relative differences are not (Mustard and Etches 2003). 
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individual holds and processes information that is useful in predicting mortality and which is 
unlikely to be observable to providers of the aforementioned financial products. 
Our focus has not been on the average accuracy of longevity expectations but on heterogeneity 
by education and cognition. The hypothesis was that the least educated and cognitively able are 
less likely to hold accurate expectations and this may result in mistaken decisions with respect to 
retirement, pensions, saving and health behaviour. While there is support in the data for the first 
part of this hypothesis, the gradients revealed in the accuracy of expectations should not obscure 
the fact that even the least educated and cognitively able are capable of predicting their longevity 
with some degree of accuracy. Even these individuals can, to an extent, be represented as agents 
forming expectations on the basis of relevant information. But the differences in the accuracy of 
expectations are marked. A marginal increase in the subjective survival probability reported by a 
high school dropout is around half as strongly correlated with a reduced actual mortality risk as is 
the same report made by a college graduate. After conditioning on health measures, smoking and 
parental longevity, the least educated can process no further information that is useful in 
predicting longevity. The higher education groups do successfully utilize further information. If 
there is an advantage to be reaped from private information and adverse selection, it is more 
likely to be enjoyed by the better educated. 
Differences in the accuracy of expectations by cognition are slightly weaker than those by 
education. With controls for objective mortality risk, there are no significant differences in the 
predictive power of expectations by cognition and the lowest cognition group, unlike high school 
dropouts, is still able to predict longevity. But differences by numeracy are stronger than those 
by education. An affinity with numbers appears to be particularly important to the formation 
and/or reporting of accurate survival probabilities.  
There is heterogeneity by education (and cognition) in the updating of longevity expectations. 
Higher education groups display greater consistency over time in the reporting of subjective 
probabilities. In a Bayesian framework, this would imply that they have more confidence in their 
prior and place relatively greater weight on it. We find little evidence that the degree to which 
survival chances are revised downward with the onset of a health condition varies by education, 
although high school dropouts are more (possibly over) responsive to psychiatric illness. 
Evidence that the higher education (and cognition) groups formulate expectations more 
systematically is provided by the fact that a substantially larger proportion of the variability in 
subjective survival probabilities can be explained for these groups. 
Given that the least educated and cognitively able hold less accurate longevity expectations, one 
would expect their economic and health investment decisions to deviate further from those that 
are optimal given the objective circumstances and risks they are exposed to. We have not tested 
whether there are behavioural consequences of mistaken expectations. Binswanger and Salm 
(2014) find that the stock holdings of less numerate HRS respondents are more weakly 
associated with reported probabilities of stock market returns. Rather than sub-optimal decisions 
being taken on the basis of biased expectations, this suggests that decisions of the least numerate 
are not taken on the basis of probabilities at all. Either way, our findings support a case for 
targeting advice regarding complex financial decisions that involve planning over a lifetime 
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horizon at the least educated, cognitively able and numerate. In particular, these individuals need 
help in formulating more accurate assessments of how long they can expect to live.  
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Figure 1: Mean difference between reported and life table survival probability by gender 
and age 
Notes: as Table 1 
 
 
a) by education      b) by cognitive functioning 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of individuals who die between 1996 and 2010 by subjective 





Table 1: Difference between reported and life table survival probability by education, 
cognition and numeracy 
   Mean Median  % reporting probability of  Non- N 
     0 50 100 response (%)   
Total -5.38 -2.20 5.14 25.80 15.75 4.09 32437 
Education        
 High school dropout & GED -13.28 -13.45 11.28 26.77 17.84 9.04 6966 
 High school graduate -6.24 -4.72 4.47 28.30 16.23 3.03 11175 
 Some College -2.77 0.63 3.42 24.93 17.20 2.65 7132 
 College 1.04 4.69 1.91 21.83 11.46 1.79 7164 
 Equality across groups: p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Cognitive functioning         
 Lowest quartile group -9.20 -6.72 8.38 25.26 18.93 7.79 8223 
 2nd lowest  -7.01 -4.91 5.69 27.36 14.58 3.57 8209 
 2nd highest -4.31 -1.25 3.31 26.87 13.98 2.61 7967 
 Highest quartile group -0.87 2.83 3.07 23.70 15.39 2.34 8038 
 Equality across groups: p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   
Numeracy        
 Lowest quartile group -7.09 -6.48 8.02 25.42 15.88 7.88 4477 
 2nd lowest  -3.85 -2.48 5.37 26.87 12.77 3.59 4324 
 2nd highest -1.52 -0.78 4.35 28.63 10.90 2.72 4118 
 Highest quartile group -1.57 2.15 4.01 26.06 9.37 2.39 4044 
 Equality across groups: p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001  
Notes: Reported probability is the stated percentage chance of surviving to a specified target  ag e. Life table 
probability is that  percentage implied by the Vital Statistics  life tables given current age and gender. Data from HRS 
waves 3-9 (total,  education & cognition) and waves 6-9 (numeracy). Sample size (N) and all  statistics are with respect 
to the estimation sample except for percentage non-response. Cognition/numeracy categories are quartile groups of 
age-sex standardized total cognition/numeracy score. ‘Equality across groups’ gives p-value for null of equal 
means/medians/proportions. For mean, it is  a Wald test that  allows for unequal variances across groups. For the 
median, it is implemented by the joint significance of the group indicators in a least absolute deviation regres sion in 





Table 2: Percentage of individuals who die between 1996 and 2010 by education, 
cognition and subjective probability of survival to 75 
   Percent N 
Education   
 High school dropout & GED 30.57 1184 
 High school graduate 19.98 1802 
 Some College 19.91 1130 
 College 15.45 1094 
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001  
Cognitive functioning    
 Lowest quartile group 28.52 1413 
 2nd lowest  21.34 1326 
 2nd highest 18.26 1243 
 Highest quartile group 16.53 1228 
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001  
Subjective survival probability to 75  
 0 45.51 312 
 1-49 28.71 498 
 50 23.96 1327 
 51-99 14.86 1918 
 100 19.74 1155 
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001  
Total 21.42 5210 
Notes: Sample includes respondents used in estimation of mortality models 
who are observed alive in wave 3 (1996). See Appendix Table A3 for 
mortality rates for sample that includes observations with missing values of 
subjective survival probability and model covariates. Cognition groups 
defined as in notes to Table 1. Subjective survival probability is the value 
reported in wave 3. Test of equal proportions is the Pearson Chi-square 
test. 
 
Table 3: Longevity expectations coefficient in mortality hazard models 









Full sample -0.0168*** -0.0129*** -0.0046*** 
  [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] 
     
 Log likelihood -3944.918 -3808.477 -3368.997 
 N 32437 32437 32437 
Drop if report survival probability:   
 0 -0.0131*** -0.0102*** -0.0035**  
   [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] 
 N 30770 30770 30770 
 50 -0.0166*** -0.0130*** -0.0048*** 
   [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] 
 N 24068 24068 24068 
 100 -0.0204*** -0.0159*** -0.0063***  
   [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0015] 
 N 27332 27332 27332 
Notes: Coefficients on difference between the subjective and life table probability of 
survival to a target  age (longevity expectation) from complementary log-log hazard models of 
mortality. Mortality risks in third column refer to indicators of health, smoking and parental 
longevity. Full estimates from the most general specification are given in Appendix Table 
A6. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at individual level in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bottom panel shows estimates 
obtained from sub-samples that exclude observations reporting subjective survival 
probability of 0, 50 and 100 percent.  
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Table 4: Longevity expectations coefficients in mortality hazard models with heterogeneity by education and cognition 



























mortality risks  
Education          
 High school dropout -0.0121*** -0.0094*** -0.0023    -0.0107*** -0.0083*** -0.0020 
  [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019]    [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0020] 
 High school graduate -0.0160*** -0.0131*** -0.0050**    -0.0134*** -0.0109*** -0.0043* 
   [0.0022] [0.0021] [0.0021]    [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0025] 
 Some College -0.0188*** -0.0156*** -0.0063***    -0.0159*** -0.0130*** -0.0053* 
   [0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0024]    [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0030] 
 College graduate -0.0210*** -0.0176*** -0.0072**    -0.0178*** -0.0148*** -0.0062 
   [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0030]    [0.0041] [0.0039] [0.0038] 
Cognitive functioning          
 Lowest quartile group    -0.0127*** -0.0099*** -0.0032* -0.0107*** -0.0083*** -0.0020 
      [0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0020] 
 2nd lowest group    -0.0178*** -0.0143*** -0.0049** -0.0142*** -0.0114*** -0.0027 
      [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0030] [0.0029] [0.0029] 
 2nd highest group    -0.0164*** -0.0128*** -0.0039 -0.0123*** -0.0093*** -0.0014 
      [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0033] 
 Highest quartile group    -0.0203*** -0.0175*** -0.0082*** -0.0157*** -0.0135*** -0.0055 
     [0.0029] [0.0028] [0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0034] 
Homog. 
2( 1)k  (p-value)  7.64 (0.0540) 7.16 (0.0670) 2.98 (0.3943) 6.28 (0.0987) 6.27 (0.0990) 2.76 (0.4304) 10.12 (0.1198) 9.93 (0.1278) 4.40 (0.6226) 
Log likelihood -3931.5119 -3804.487 -3367.3963 -3926.5436 -3802.6306 -3367.3553 -3920.2381 -3800.5753 -3366.4387 
N 32437 32437 32437 32437 32437 32437 32437 32437 32437 
Notes: As Table 3, with the following additions. This table gives estimates from models that include interactions between the longevity expectation variable and education and/or cognition 
categories. The coefficient on the longevity expectation variable for each education/cognition category is presented (i.e. coefficient for reference category plus coefficient on category-specific 
interaction). These approximate the relative effect on the hazard rate of a marginal change in longevity expectations for each category. For the model allowing heterogeneity by education and 
cognition (right-hand panel), the effects by education are for the lowest quartile group of cognition and the effects by cognition are for high school dropouts. Standard errors in parentheses 
are estimated by the delta method with adjustment for clustering at the individual level. Bold indicates that the coefficient differs at least at 10% from that for the lowest education/cognition 




Table 5: Longevity expectations coefficients in mortality hazard models – robustness to 
dropping focal responses 
 Dropping subjective survival probability responses of: 
 0 50 100 
 Education Cognition Education Cognition Education Cognition 
Lowest group -0.0078*** -0.0086*** -0.0092*** -0.0100*** -0.0118*** -0.0119*** 
 [0.0023] [0.0021] [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0021] 
2nd lowest group -0.0085*** -0.0097*** -0.0132*** -0.0144*** -0.0157*** -0.0161*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0020] [0.0024] [0.0025] [0.0027] 
2nd highest group -0.0131*** -0.0115*** -0.0155*** -0.0136*** -0.0181*** -0.0161*** 
 [0.0029] [0.0032] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0030] 
Highest group -0.0147*** -0.0128*** -0.0190*** -0.0171*** -0.0214*** -0.0225*** 
 [0.0036] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0028] [0.0033] [0.0030] 
Homog. 
2( 1)k  (p-value)  
 
4.11(0.2502) 1.38(0.7095) 8.70(0.0336) 5.71(0.1268) 6.87(0.0760) 8.91(0.0304) 
Log likelihood -3296.6838 -3296.4852 -2831.0412 -2831.3772 -3330.7778 -3326.9095 
N 30770 30770 24068 24068 27332 27332 
Notes: as Table 4. Estimates correspond to those from models including age-sex and socioeconomic controls reported 
in Table 4 with observations reporting subjective survival probabilities of 0, 50 and 100 percent dropped from the 
sample. Lowest group is high school dropouts for education and lowest quartile group for cognition. Highest group is 
college graduates for education and highest quartile group for cognition. Intermediate groups as in Table 4. 
Homogeneity test as in Table 4. Bold indicates that the group coefficient is significantly different from that of the lowest 
group at 10% level or less. 
 
Table 6: Longevity expectations coefficients in mortality hazard models with 
heterogeneity by education and numeracy 
  Education Numeracy Education & Numeracy  
Education    
 High school dropout -0.0122***  -0.0099*** 
  [0.0025]  [0.0028] 
 High school graduate -0.0125***  -0.0082 
   [0.0027]  [0.0031] 
 Some College -0.0161***  -0.0110 
   [0.0033]  [0.0040] 
 College graduate -0.0178***  -0.0115 
   [0.0036]  [0.0046] 
Numeracy    
 Lowest quartile group  -0.0096*** -0.0099*** 
    [0.0023] [0.0028] 
 2nd lowest group  -0.0144*** -0.0099*** 
    [0.0032] [0.0038] 
 2nd highest group  -0.0155*** -0.0146*** 
    [0.0030] [0.0040] 
 Highest quartile group  -0.0206*** -0.0153*** 
   [0.0035] [0.0045] 
Homog. 
2( 1)k  (p-value)  2.38 (0.4980)  7.87 (0.0488)  8.76 (0.1875)  
Log likelihood -2340.65 -2335.537 -2335.138 
N 16963 16963 16963 
Notes: As Table 4. Estimates obtained from models estimated using data from wave 6 onwards 
including age-sex and socioeconomic controls only. Numeracy categories are quartile groups formed 
from age-sex standardised numeracy score. Bold indicates significant difference from lowest group at 





















Lagged longevity expectation  0.5463*** 
 




[0.0113] [0.0091] [0.0112] [0.0115] 
Onset of health condition 
       Lung disease/Cancer -6.7950*** 
 





[1.8196] [1.3545] [1.6486] [1.6703] 
 Diabetes -2.0164** 
 





[2.0117] [1.6158] [1.6970] [1.6782] 
 Psychiatric illness -6.7744*** 
 





[2.6060] [2.2020] [2.2931] [2.8032] 
 Stroke/Heart disease -3.5715*** 
 





[1.8607] [1.2781] [1.5708] [1.4152] 
 Hypertension/Arthritis 0.3562 
 





[1.2301] [0.8636] [0.9158] [0.8280] 
New hospitalization  -1.8658*** 
 





[1.0131] [0.7443] [0.7944] [0.7662] 
Mother alive at last wave 2.8253*** 
 





[0.8588] [0.5499] [0.6034] [0.5223] 
Father alive at last wave 3.0075*** 
 





[1.5462] [0.8289] [0.8272] [0.7802] 
Widowed since last  wave -0.9443 
 





[1.9548] [1.3914] [2.1031] [1.7996] 
Female -3.4906*** 
 





[0.7129] [0.4724] [0.5427] [0.4731] 
Age - 54 -0.6637*** 
 





[0.3141] [0.2015] [0.2292] [0.2014] 
(Age -54)  squared  0.0439*** 
 





[0.0140] [0.0091] [0.0106] [0.0094] 
Target age changed from 75 to 80 2.4269*** 
 





[1.1274] [0.7691] [0.9007] [0.7914] 
Target age changed from 80 to 85 10.5858*** 
 





[1.3138] [0.8976] [1.1486] [0.9934] 
Target age changed from 85 to 90 8.7081*** 
 





[2.7281] [1.8533] [2.4772] [2.0083] 
Intercept -1.0092 
 





[1.6977] [1.0867] [1.2074] [1.0541] 
 
       R-squared  0.3366 
 
0.2983 0.3125 0.3518 0.3648 
N 32437 
 
6966 11175 7132 7164 
Notes: Least squares estimates of model (4) for full sample and for each education group. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Bold indicates coefficient is significantly different from respective coefficient estimated for high school 







Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table A1: Target ages used in subjective probability of survival question  
 
Respondent’s current age: 
Wave < 65 65 66-69 70-74 75-79 
3 (cohort aged 54-65) 75 75 - - - 
4 (cohort aged 56-67) 75 75  -a - - 
5 (cohort aged 58-69) 75b 80c 80 - - 
6 (cohort aged 60-71) 75b 80c 80 85 - 
7 (cohort aged 62-73) 75b 80c 80 85 - 
8 (cohort aged 64-75) 75b 80c 80 85 90 
9 (cohort aged 66-77) - - 80 85 90 
Notes: a. In wave 4, HRS documentation indicates that the question was to be skipped if the respondent 
was older than 75. But from the data it appears that the question was skipped if older than 65. This means 
that there is no information on survival expectations for individuals aged 66 and 67 in our sample in wave 4. 
b. Also asked to report the chance of living to age 80 (85 in wave 8). c. Also asked to report the chance of 
living to age 75. We opted to use the age 80 target because there are many missing observations for target 
age of 75 in wave 8, and also to maintain greater consistency across waves.  
 
Table A2: Mean difference between reported and life table survival probability by 
education, cognition and numeracy 
  Quartile group of total cognition score  Test of equal 
Education Lowest 
quartile 2nd lowest 2nd highest Highest quartile 
means: p-value 
 High school dropout and GED -13.42 -14.21 -12.64 -11.41 0.234 
  (N=3550) (N=1619) (N=1112) (N=685)  
 High school graduate -8.54 -6.57 -4.80 -4.74 <0.001 
  (N=2814) (N=3233) (N=2793) (N=2335)  
 Some college -3.79 -6.49 -2.57 0.99 <0.001 
  (N=1286) (N=1881) (N=1855) (N=2110)  
 College graduate 1.52 -0.74 -0.98 3.38 <0.001 
  (N=573) (N=1476) (N=2207) (N=2908)  
Test of equal means: p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Quartile group of numeracy score  
 Lowest 
quartile 2nd lowest 2nd highest Highest quartile 
 
 High school dropout and -10.10 -11.90 -8.82 -13.10 0.1683 
 (N=1840) (N=850) (N=594) (N=316)  
 High school graduate -7.61 -3.12 -3.38 -4.27 <0.001 
 (N=1563) (N=1686) (N=1384) (N=1202)  
 Some college -0.66 -2.57 -0.38 -2.07 0.2737 
 (N=708) (N=954) (N=1003) (N=1041)  
 College graduate -2.13 1.40 3.56 3.41 0.001 
Test of equal means: p-value (N=366) (N=834) (N=1137) (N=1485)  
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 




Table A3: Table 2 for sample including observations missing on subjective survival 
probability and covariates 
   As Table 2 + missing on 
covariates  
As Table 2 + missing on 
covariates  & subjective survival 
probability 
Education Percent N Percent N 
 High school dropout & GED 32.78 2004 32.68 2240 
 High school graduate 21.02 2374 21.04 2472 
 Some College 21.05 1425 21.2 1462 
 College 16.39 1287 16.74 1314 
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001 7090 <0.001 7488 
Cognitive functioning      
 Lowest quartile group 33.93 1677 34.09 1889 
 2nd lowest  24.13 1832 24.09 1914 
 2nd highest 18.66 1801 18.59 1861 
 Highest quartile group 17.98 1780 18.15 1824 
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001 7090 <0.001 7488 
Subjective survival probability to 75    
 0 48.28 495   
 1-49 31.28 729   
 50 25.15 1793   
 51-99 16.51 2435   
 100 21.18 1638   
 Test equal proportions, p-value <0.001 7090   
Total 23.51 7090 23.80 7488 
Notes: As Table 2 in text.    
 
Table A4: Table corresponding to Figure 2 - Percentage of individuals who die between 1996 and 
2010 by subjective probability of survival to 75, education and cognition 
  Subjective probability of survival to 75  
  0 1-49 50 51-99 100 Test equality 
Education      p-value 
 High school drop out 46.95 35.22 29.28 22.71 27.34 <0.001 
 N 164 159 321 273 267  
 High school graduate 41.76 27.22 23.19 14.26 16.36 <0.001 
 N 91 169 526 582 434  
 Some college 45.95 28.28 23.05 15.01 18.38 <0.001 
 N 37 99 269 453 272  
 College graduate 50.00 18.31 18.96 11.80 18.68 <0.001 
 N 20 71 211 610 182  
Cognitive functioning       
 Lowest quartile group 49.02 34.86 30.71 18.78 24.48 <0.001 
  153 175 368 378 339  
 2nd lowest 51.25 23.08 25.76 15.78 16.07 <0.001 
  80 117 361 488 280  
 2nd highest 36.36 33.03 19.58 12.80 17.62 <0.001 
  44 109 337 492 261  
 Highest quartile group 28.57 19.59 17.62 13.21 19.64 <0.001 
  35 97 261 560 275  




Table A5: Definitions of socioeconomic, health, health behaviour and parental longevity 
covariates used in models of mortality 
Variable Description 
Education In categories: high school drop outs and General Educational Development (GED) (0-11 years of 
schooling and no qualification other than GED); high school graduate (12 years of schooling and high 
school diploma); some college (more than 12 years of schooling and high school diploma or GED); college 
and above (bachelor degree or higher). 
Education parents Number of education years of mother and of father. 
Income Logarithm of total household income. 
Wealth Logarithm of total wealth (excluding secondary residence) and indicator of positive wealth (0,1). 
Employment Indicator of whether currently working for pay (0,1). 
Race Categories White/Caucasian, Black/African American and other (reference category). 
Marital status Indicator of whether married/partnered (1) or widowed, divorced or never married (0). 
Lung disease Respondent has ever been told by a doctor that he/she has the condition. Mortality models include an 
indicator of whether condition reported in the previous wave (0,1) and another of whether did not report 
condition in last wave but did in present wave (X since last wave (0,1)). Expectations updating model 
includes the latter only in lagged dependent variable specification and fixed effects model includes 








Cognition – recall Age-sex standardized total score on immediate and delayed word recall tests in current wave  
Cognition – count Age-sex standardized total score on the serial 7’s and backwards counting tests. 
CES-D score Score (0-8) is the sum of five “negative” indicators minus two “positive" indicators. Negative indicators 
correspond to reports that all or most of the time experience: depression, feeling that everything is an 
effort, restless sleep, loneliness, sadness, and feeling that could not get going. Positive indicators are 
whether the respondent felt happy and enjoyed life all or most of the time.  We include the current and the 
lagged score.  
Mobility index Current and lagged score (0-5) that is the sum of indicators of some difficulty with: walking several blocks, 
walking one block, walking across the room, climbing several flights of stairs and climbing one flight of 
stairs. We include the current and the lagged score. 
Large muscle 
index 
Current and lagged score (0-4) that is the sum of indicators of some difficulty with: sitting for two hours, 
getting up from a chair, stooping or kneeling or crouching, and pushing or pulling a large object. 
ADL index Current and lagged score (0-5) that sums indicators of difficulty with the activities of daily living: bathing, 
eating, dressing, and getting in or out of bed. Difficulty walking across a room excluded because it is 
included in the mobility index. 
Fine motor skills 
indicator 
Current and lagged indicator (0,1) of whether individual has some difficulty picking up a dime. Difficulty 
with eating and dressing excluded because these are included in the ADL index. 
iADL index Current and lagged score (0-3) that is sum of indicators of some difficult with the instrumental activities of 
daily living: taking medication, using a telephone and handling money. 
Hospitalization  Indicator (0,1) of whether the respondent reports any overnight hospital stay since the last interview, or the 
last 2 years for new interviewees. We also include the lag of this indicator. 
BMI  Current and lagged body mass index - weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. 
Smoker Whether current smoker, former smoker or never smoked (reference).  
Cognition – count Age-sex standardized total score on the serial 7’s and backwards counting tests. 
Parental longevity Separately for father and mother: age of the parent (currently or at death, if already deceased); indicator of 





Table A6: Mortality hazard coefficients from model with all controls and without 
heterogeneity in longevity coefficient by education and cognition (Table 3, right-hand 
column) 
Longevity expectation -0.0046*** [0.0012] 
   
White 0.0303 [0.1996] Heart disease at last wave 0.1661**  [0.0842] 
Black 0.0432 [0.2116] Heart disease since last 
wave 
0.1732 [0.1551] 
Married or partnered -0.2136*** [0.0820] Stroke at last wave -0.0244 [0.1264] 
High school graduate 0.1666*   [0.0934] Stroke since last wave -0.0016 [0.2299] 
Some college 0.2974*** [0.1079] Psychiatric illness at last 
wave 
0.0209 [0.1055] 
College graduate 0.3207**  [0.1267] Psychiatric illness since 
last wave 
0.1134 [0.2206] 
Education years mother -0.0073 [0.0131] Arthritis at last wave -0.1491*   [0.0810] 
Education years father -0.0014 [0.0117] Arthritis since last wave -0.0522 [0.1773] 
Currently working for pay -0.4930*** [0.0948] Lagged mobility index 0.0864**  [0.0377] 
Ln(Income) 0.0159 [0.0301] Current mobility index 0.2859*** [0.0356] 
Ln(Wealth) -0.0427**  [0.0200] Lagged large muscle index -0.1029**  [0.0409]] 
Has positive wealth 0.2157 [0.2288] Current large muscle 
index 
-0.0494 [0.0399] 
Cognition – recall -0.1306*** [0.0389] Lagged ADL index -0.0098 [0.0609] 
Cognition – count -0.0636*   [0.0354] Current ADL index 0.069 [0.0552] 
Age father -0.0311 [0.0326] Lagged fine motor skills -0.0556 [0.1385] 
Age mother -0.0162 [0.0161] Current fine motor skills -0.0657 [0.1337] 
Father died -2.6021 [2.8120] Lagged iADL index -0.0227 [0.1049] 
Mother died -1.2449 [1.3989] Current iADL index 0.0308 [0.0944] 
Father died x father's age-at-death 0.0285 [0.0327] Lagged CES-D score -0.0764*** [0.0229] 
Mother died x mother's age-at-death 0.0145 [0.0162] Current CES-D score 0.0338 [0.0206] 
High blood pressure at last wave 0.0786 [0.0775] Lagged hospitalization 0.3340*** [0.0771] 
High blood pressure since last wave -0.0031 [0.1651] Current hospitalization 0.4798*** [0.0806] 
Diabetes at last wave 0.5997*** [0.0816] Lagged BMI 0.0664*** [0.0125] 
Diabetes since last wave 0.2019 [0.1870] Current BMI -0.1055*** [0.0136] 
Cancer at last wave 0.6125*** [0.0916] Former smoker) 0.3601*** [0.0880] 
Cancer since last wave 1.4437*** [0.1183] Current smoker 0.7490*** [0.1074] 
Lung disease at last wave 0.3078*** [0.0933] Constant 0.4916 [3.1287] 
Lung disease since last wave 0.5908*** [0.1627]    
N 32437  Log likelihood 0.4916  
Notes: Table shows coefficients from the complementary log-log hazard models of mortality corresponding to right-hand 
column of Table 3. Model also includes gender specific age-year dummy variables. Standard errors allowing for clustering at the 





Table A7: Mortality hazard coefficients with respect to health conditions 
 Coefficient Robust SE 
Lung disease 0.8840*** [0.0805] 
Cancer 0.8546*** [0.0747] 
Diabetes 0.6396*** [0.0739] 
Stroke 0.3415*** [0.1033] 
Psychiatric illness 0.3379*** [0.0866] 
Heart disease 0.3062*** [0.0757] 
Hypertension 0.0871 [0.0734] 
Arthritis -0.0741 [0.0733] 
Hospitalization 0.8446*** [0.0723] 
   
Log-likelihood -3679.7839  
N 32437  
Notes: Table shows coefficients from a complementary 
log-log hazard model of mortality. Hazard ratio given by 
exponentiating coefficient. Each health condition is 
represented  by an indicator of ever having been diagnosed  
with the condition. Hospitalization is an indicator of 
having been hospitalized in the past two years. Model also  
includes a dummy for gender and a complete set of age 
(year) indicators. Standard errors allowing for clustering at  
the individual level in parentheses. *** indicates  





















Ever had health condition 
       Lung disease/Cancer -5.1413*** 
 





[1.9028] [1.2561] [1.4953] [1.5297] 
 Diabetes -0.4931 
 





[1.9450] [1.2510] [1.7455] [1.5800] 
 Psychiatric illness -3.1104*** 
 





[2.3865] [2.0230] [2.0890] [2.4610] 
 Stroke/Heart disease -2.7541*** 
 





[1.9544] [1.2553] [1.5050] [1.2515] 
 Hypertension/Arthritis 0.1465 
 





[1.5467] [1.0702] [1.1912] [0.9394] 
Hospitalization -1.3874*** 
 





[0.8777] [0.6243] [0.6970] [0.6481] 
Mother alive at cu rrent wave -0.2965 
 





[1.7047] [1.0867] [1.0767] [0.9881] 
Father alive at cu rrent wave -0.0702 
 





[3.1465] [1.5649] [1.5564] [1.5060] 
Widow/er at current wave 0.1129 
 





[1.7554] [1.2910] [1.7007] [1.5879] 
Age - 54 -0.9694*** 
 





[0.3631] [0.2343] [0.2693] [0.2378] 
(Age - 54) squared  0.0145** 
 





[0.0190] [0.0122] [0.0150] [0.0129] 
Target age is 80 4.1481*** 
 





[1.2720] [0.8314] [0.9729] [0.8479] 
Target age is 85 16.7964*** 
 





[2.3371] [1.5326] [1.9677] [1.6835] 
Target age is 90 or more 26.5212*** 
 





[4.2597] [2.7310] [3.6755] [3.0250] 
Intercept 0.3485 
 





[2.0718] [1.3490] [1.5319] [1.2400] 
 
       R-squared  0.0498 
 
0.0482 0.0447 0.0499 0.0732 
N 32437 
 
6966 11175 7132 7164 
Notes: Estimates of fixed effects model for full sample and for each education group. Instead of indicators of 
health/widowhood/target age changes between the previous and the current waves (as in model (4)), this model includes 
current indicators. In particular, we include indicators of: ever having been diagnosed with each condition; of having been 
hospitalized in the past two years; of being currently a widow/er; and of each target age (reference is 75). Parental living 
status is represented by indicators of whether mother/father is currently alive. Age and gender are modelled as in model 
(4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bold indicates coefficient is significantly different from respective coefficient 















Lagged longevity expectation  0.4686*** 0.5658*** 0.5831*** 0.5812*** 
  
[0.0109] [0.0101] [0.0102] [0.0107]    
Onset of health condition 
     Lung disease/Cancer -3.8018** -7.9288*** -8.6482*** -7.3121*** 
 
 
[1.7812] [1.5849] [1.5733] [1.4781]    
 Diabetes -1.9809 -0.7162 -1.733 -3.2172**  
 
 
[1.9627] [1.7783] [1.6960] [1.5810]    
 Psychiatric illness -6.5160** -9.5461*** -3.7537 -5.7612**  
 
 
[2.6044] [2.0488] [2.6882] [2.7243]    
 Stroke/Heart disease -3.5747** -3.6532** -3.7931*** -3.1317**  
 
 
[1.7686] [1.4960] [1.3493] [1.3663]    
 Hypertension/Arthritis 0.1537 0.3945 -0.5256 1.2842 
 
 
[1.1506] [0.9361] [0.8829] [0.8323]    
New hospitalization  -2.4718** -1.4451* -1.9134** -1.3409*   
 
 
[0.9684] [0.8089] [0.7786] [0.7385]    
Mother alive at last wave 3.3267*** 2.4240*** 2.7418*** 2.4147*** 
 
 
[0.7389] [0.6226] [0.5682] [0.5595]    
Father alive at last wave 4.1210*** 3.3170*** 1.8760** 2.2680*** 
 
 
[1.2206] [0.9347] [0.8340] [0.7966]    
Widowed since last  wave 1.551 -0.9871 -3.2048* -1.5648 
 
 
[1.7087] [1.9219] [1.9277] [1.7328]    
Female -4.5706*** -2.9848*** -2.6276*** -3.6386*** 
 
 
[0.6317] [0.5312] [0.4956] [0.4929]    
Age – 54 -1.1121*** -0.4811** -0.4043* -0.6723*** 
 
 
[0.2792] [0.2240] [0.2140] [0.2147]    
(Age - 54) squared  0.0696*** 0.0352*** 0.0301*** 0.0404*** 
 
 
[0.0127] [0.0102] [0.0100] [0.0098]    
Target age changed from 75 to 80 2.9533*** 1.4370 1.6245** 3.7217*** 
 
 
[1.0273] [0.8839] [0.8246] [0.7957]    
Target age changed from 80 to 85 12.5981*** 10.4589*** 10.4421*** 8.8431*** 
 
 
[1.2575] [1.0411] [1.0511] [0.9568]    
Target age changed from 85 to 90 9.6208*** 6.1292*** 11.1600*** 8.0242*** 
 
 
[2.7155] [2.2393] [2.1455] [1.9439]    
Intercept -1.9348 -2.3565** -1.4026 1.6878 
 
 
[1.4940] [1.1949] [1.1191] [1.1338]    
 
     R-squared  0.2670 0.3516 0.3759 0.3743 
N 8223 8209 7967 8038 

















Lagged longevity expectation  0.4841*** 0.5771*** 0.5843*** 0.6080*** 
  
[0.0144] [0.0140] [0.0142] [0.0142]    
Onset of health condition 
     Lung disease/Cancer -4.5317** -3.4926* -7.6592*** -6.8073*** 
 
 
[2.2152] [1.8809] [1.9788] [1.8556]    
 Diabetes -1.0091 -4.2286* -2.3673 -0.9311 
 
 
[2.3953] [2.5054] [2.1200] [2.1219]    
 
Psychiatric illness -4.3694 -4.2132 
-
10.8610*** -6.0394*   
 
 
[3.7043] [3.2229] [3.3918] [3.2051]    
 Stroke/Heart disease -2.9018 0.1637 -2.9794 -3.9389**  
 
 
[2.0986] [1.8742] [1.8582] [1.7310]    
 Hypertension/Arthritis 0.4551 0.5789 1.8736 -0.7856 
 
 
[1.4711] [1.2457] [1.2340] [1.1322]    
New hospitalization  -1.2904 -1.8633* -1.7234 -1.5502 
 
 
[1.2057] [1.0838] [1.0492] [0.9996]    
Mother alive at last wave 3.6096*** 3.5276*** 0.7197 4.3028*** 
 
 
[1.1238] [0.9478] [0.9879] [0.8255]    
Father alive at last wave 5.2294** 2.8733* 3.5598** 5.7351*** 
 
 
[2.4138] [1.6220] [1.7794] [1.4002]    
Widowed since last  wave -4.3240* -1.0822 -1.2721 0.1283 
 
 
[2.5657] [2.1249] [2.0189] [2.6325]    
Female -4.8475*** -3.6370*** -3.9664*** -2.8236*** 
 
 
[0.8504] [0.7343] [0.7333] [0.6954]    
Age – 54 -1.3675* 0.6742 0.9307 0.4036 
 
 
[0.8210] [0.7567] [0.8337] [0.7046]    
(Age -54)  squared  0.0772** -0.0073 -0.0135 0.0081 
 
 
[0.0303] [0.0276] [0.0284] [0.0253]    
Target age changed from 75 to 80 3.0330** 2.2605** 1.9859* 3.0527*** 
 
 
[1.2054] [1.0629] [1.1249] [1.0713]    
Target age changed from 80 to 85 13.5035*** 11.9616*** 8.4481*** 7.4986*** 
 
 
[1.3177] [1.1004] [0.9903] [1.0133]    
Target age changed from 85 to 90 12.2427*** 8.0156*** 11.3444*** 6.7202*** 
 
 
[3.0688] [2.5683] [2.0295] [2.2312]    
Intercept -0.1163 -9.6026* -9.694 -7.7117 
 
 
[5.3618] [4.9357] [6.0811] [4.6932]    
 
     R-squared  0.2936 0.3627 0.3757 0.411 
N 4477 4324 4118 4044 
Notes: As for Table 7,  except that here groups are based on quartiles of total numeracy 





Appendix B: Derivation of empirical specification of expectations updating from 
Bayesian learning model 
If expectations are updated in a Bayesian fashion, then the posterior probability of survival to a 
target age  itP  is a weighted average of the prior  1itP  and the risk assessed on the basis of new 
information that may be gleaned, for example, from the onset of disease or the death of a parent, 
 1 , 0, 0, 0 100it it it itP P r r
 
 
   




itr  is the risk equivalent of the new information utilized, and   and   represent the 
precision of beliefs in the prior and the risk assessment respectively (Viscusi and O'Connor 1984, Viscusi 1991). 
The individual is assumed to process information, such as being diagnosed with cancer, into a 
probability of survival – a risk level  itr . If the individual were 100% confident in this new 
information, then the prior would be completely discarded. But there is likely to be uncertainty in 
the prognosis for a given diagnosis, such that the posterior shifts only marginally from the prior. 
The greater the relative precision of the belief in the prior, the less will be the deviation from it.  
Let the risk equivalent weighted by its precision parameter be a linear function of observable 
information and a random error, such that (A1) becomes, 




     

it itHealth δ Relative θ . (A2) 
Note that age and gender are relevant, even though their values at t are predictable when 
expectations are formed at t-1 because the probability of surviving to a target age rises in a way 
that depends on age and gender at time passes. Consequently, conditional on the previously 
reported probability, age and gender always provide relevant information in reassessing the 
probability of surviving to the target age. 
Replacing each subjective probability with its difference from the respective life table probability 
 LitP gives, 
  1 1,
L L
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it itHealth δ Relative θ  (A3) 
The term in parentheses is a function of the change in the life table probability of reaching a 
target age. This varies only with age and gender. Subsuming it into the demographic effects 
results in (4).  
